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GAY AND LESBIAN ACCESS TO
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
John A. Robertsont
ABSTRACT
Legal battles over same-sex marriage and technological develop-
ments in assisted reproduction have placed the question of the right of
gays and lesbians to procreate on the public agenda. This article ana-
lyzes the extent to which rights of procreative liberty extend to the
use of assisted reproductive techniques to have children and whether,
if such rights exist, they can be denied to persons who are gay or les-
bian. It shows that unproven concerns about the impact of gay and
lesbian parenting on offspring are not relevant to situations in which
children have already been born to gays and lesbians or will come
into existence as a result of their reproduction. As a result, concerns
about impact on offspring are not a valid ground for denying gays and
lesbians same-sex marriage or access to assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. The article concludes by applying this framework to cur-
rently available reproductive techniques, such as artificial insemina-
tion, egg donation, and surrogate motherhood, and to futuristic ones,
such as the ability to screen embryos for "gay genes," reproductive
cloning by gays and lesbians, and the fusion of embryos or gametes
from same-sex partners.
t Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law at the University of Texas School of Law. The author is
grateful to Les Green, Tim Murphy, and Tony Reese for helpful comments on an earlier draft
and to Jon Hyland and Reese McKnight for expert research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Past struggles for gay and lesbian rights have confronted criminal
bans on gay sexuality and discrimination in employment, the military,
and other areas of public life. With Lawrence v. Texas' having struck
down laws against sodomy, the front lines of the struggle for gay2
rights have moved to issues of same-sex marriage and child-rearing.
The same-sex marriage debate has also placed gay and lesbian re-
production on the public agenda in a more direct way than has oc-
curred in previous controversies over gay and lesbian rearing of chil-
dren.3 The issue of same-sex marriage has reminded the country that
gays and lesbians often have and rear offspring.4 Indeed, gay and
lesbian parenting of children was a driving force in Massachusetts'
landmark legal recognition of same-sex marriage.5 As more gays and
lesbians enter into partnership arrangements, a growing number will
seek to have children. To do so they will turn to assisted reproductive
techniques (ARTs) to reproduce, thus raising questions about access
to such techniques by heterosexuals and homosexuals alike.
Assisted reproduction is the use of non-coital technologies to con-
ceive a child and initiate pregnancy. Most widely used is artificial
insemination, but in vitro fertilization (IVF), egg donation, surrogacy,
and genetic screening techniques are also available. In the more dis-
tant future, the prospect of genetic alteration of gametes or embryos
looms as a way to select the traits of offspring. Heterosexual indi-
viduals and couples seek out ARTs when they are infertile, which
occurs in 1 in 8 married couples. 6 Homosexuals may also seek ARTs
1 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 While Lawrence provides important protection to gays and lesbians, some commenta-
tors from the gay rights community have criticized the relational/marriage model of sexuality
that it implies as overly domesticating gay sexuality, transforming sodomites and perverts into
domesticated couples. Katherine M. Franke, Commentary: The Domesticated Liberty of Law-
rence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2004) ("The price of the victory in Lawrence
has been to trade sexuality for domesticity.").
3 Those issues arose in the context of child custody, adoption, and foster parenting. See
infra at note 36.
4 In 1987 the estimate was that abut 3 million gay men and lesbians in the United States
were biological parents, and between 8 and 10 million children were raised in gay or lesbian
households. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 475 (William B. Rubenstein ed. 1993).
5 Goodridge v. Dep't fo Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Other grounds for
recognition of such a fight have been human dignity and freedom in intimate relations. See,
e.g., M. v. H., [1999 2 S.C.R. 3 (ruling that discrimination against same-sex spouses in respect
of spousal support is illegal); Halpern v. City of Toronto, [2003] 65 OR. (3d) 161 (ruling that
same-sex couples have right to marry).
6 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 49-57 (1987) (reporting results of 1987 survey studying physician and
sperm bank practice).
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for infertility, but more often they use them because they cannot re-
produce with their partners or others of the same sex.
As more gays and lesbians seek to reproduce, conflict over gay ac-
cess to assisted reproductive techniques is likely to increase. Just as
some persons have questioned whether being raised by a gay parent is
good for a child, some have questioned whether gays and lesbians
should have children in the first place. 7  Although many fertility clin-
ics offer ART services to gays and lesbians, others do not or do so
only for lesbians but not gay males. While Canada and Sweden have
explicitly recognized the right of gay and lesbians to have access to
ARTs, many countries forbid access altogether. 8 Such restrictions
limit or infringe the procreative liberty of gays and lesbians and raise
the question of the extent to which gays and lesbians, like heterosexu-
als, have rights to procreate using ARTs.
This article analyzes the procreative liberty of gays and lesbians,
their right to use ARTs to form families, and the implications of such
rights for family law and access to ART services. It argues that all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation or marital status, have the
right to procreate and to use ARTs when necessary to achieve that
goal. If so, the state cannot deny gays and lesbians access to ARTs to
have children. 9 Whether they will have access to a particular tech-
nique turns on whether access is granted to persons generally and on
whether private clinics are free to discriminate against gays and lesbi-
ans in accepting patients. If homosexuality is not a valid basis for
withholding care, as I argue below, then sexual orientation should be
added to the conditions against which private providers cannot dis-
criminate.10
7 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 983 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J. dissenting).
8 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C., ch.2 (2004). BBC News, "Sweden to Allow
IVF for Lesbians," March 3, 2005 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315145.stm.
Most countries that ban gay and lesbian access do so by limiting ARTs to married couples,
which with a few exceptions necessarily excludes gays and lesbians. Bartha M. Knoppers and
Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical, and Social
Issues, 17 AM. J. LAW & MED. 329 (1991). Italy recently passed a law having the same effect.
Law 40/2004, February 19, 2004, Gazz. Uff. No. 45 (February 24, 2004). Even if there are no
legislative or other "legal" prohibitions on unmarried individuals, gays or lesbians obtaining
ART, as is the case in the United Kingdom, the statutory requirement that providers protect the
"welfare of the child" is often interpreted to make sexual orientation and/or unmarried status a
condition in practice for receiving services. The HFEA, however, does not condition licenses
on not treating gays and lesbians or single persons. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority, Code of Practice, 9, Jan. 2004, pp. 29-31, available at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/HFEAPublications/CodeofPractice.
9 Although most homosexuals may be sexually fertile, because of their homosexuality
they may not be attracted to or be willing to mate with members of the opposite sex or may lack
opportunities to do so. For them ARTs may be the only way to procreate.
10 There may still be, however, a few instances in which homosexual status itself is rele-
vant in determining access in such futuristic techniques as reproductive cloning for fertile lesbi-
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The article begins by analyzing the concept of procreative liberty
and the extent to which it protects the right of infertile persons to use
ARTs to form families. It then shows that gays and lesbians have the
same interests in reproducing as do heterosexuals and should be ac-
corded similar rights to reproduce, including similar access to ARTs
as needed. In making that argument, it is necessary to address the
argument raised in disputes over child custody, adoption, and same-
sex marriage about whether gays and lesbians are desirable or ade-
quate parents. Once it is shown that protecting children is not an ade-
quate basis for denying gays and lesbians child rearing or reproduc-
tive opportunities, the case is strong for according to gays and lesbi-
ans the same rights to assisted reproduction that other persons have.
In the future, the willingness of persons to procreate may also be
dependent on knowledge about the genetic make-up of expected off-
spring and the ability to choose, shape, or otherwise construct their
genome. Although the availability of these techniques is still highly
speculative, this article also addresses the issues that would arise if
genetic tests for sexual orientation existed or genetic fusion of same-
sex gametes were possible.
Analysis of these issues will show that a social preference to have
children raised by married heterosexuals is not a sufficient basis to
deny gays and lesbians the right to marry or to have offspring through
the use of ARTs. The final sections of the article show how due re-
spect for the procreative liberty of gays and lesbians protects access to
currently available ARTs and to those that may be available in the
future. It ends with a discussion of the use of ARTs to screen for a
"gay gene," if such is ever discovered, to use reproductive cloning,
and to use techniques combining genomes from two gay individuals.
II. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
To assess rights to homosexual procreation we must first deter-
mine the status of reproductive choice generally. The Supreme
Court's privacy and family jurisprudence has dealt for the most part
only with a subset of reproductive issues, most notably liberty claims
to avoid reproduction through birth control and abortion. With the
1992 reaffirmation in Southeastern Pennsylvania Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey" of the basic premises of Roe v. Wade,' 2 those rights
are now established as a probably stable part of the medical, legal,
ans or embryo fusion and gamete haploidization techniques for male homosexuals.
11 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and social landscape. Recent battles over partial-birth abortion and
fetal homicide and protection laws chip away at the edges but leave
the basic right to terminate pregnancy intact.' 3 The appointment of
new Supreme Court Justices, however, could quickly change the sta-
bility of this arrangement.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the right to repro-
duce only in dicta. 4 The 1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma'5 is a
much-cited precedent here. Although the Skinner Court invalidated
the compulsory sterilization of certain repeat offenders on equal pro-
tection grounds, it added a stirring endorsement of the right to repro-
duce as "one of the basic civil rights of man."' 6 Since then, however,
the Court has rarely encountered specific claims of rights to repro-
duce, though it has seen fit many times in dicta to state that control
over procreation and having children is protected.' 7  State courts,
however, have held that conditioning probation for non-payment of
child-support on avoiding reproduction does not necessarily violate
the right to reproduce. 18 Nor do prison officials violate prisoner re-
productive rights when they refuse to allow incarcerated males to
provide sperm for artificial insemination outside of prison. 9 Neither
the Supreme Court nor lower courts have directly addressed the exis-
tence of fundamental rights to use assisted reproduction and genetic
screening technologies.
Although the Court has talked about the right to reproduce mainly
in dicta, there is ample reason to think that that dicta would become
13 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004; 18 U.S.C. § 1531
(2004) Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003; National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330
F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting permanent injunction granted); Planned Parenthood
Federation of America v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (granting permanent
injunction against Partial Birth-Abortion Act of 2003).
14 They have also involved the right to rear one's biologic offspring. See Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
16 Id.
17 For a fuller analysis and relevant cites, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 2 (1994). In Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), the Court went so far as to state "if the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."
18 State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 2000 (Wis. 2002) (upholding an anti-procreation condi-
tion of probation for defendant convicted of non-payment of child-support); State v. Taltey, 814
N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004) (striking down as overbroad an anti-procreation condition of proba-
tion for defendant convicted of non-payment).
19 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that a prison in-
mate has no right to provide sperm to his wife for artificial insemination outside the prison);
Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). See ROBERTSON, supra note 17, 35-
38 (discussing Goodwin v Turner). See also, "Mobster's Smuggled Sperm Counts for Extra 16
Months in Prison," at http://www.com/203/Law/08/21/smuggled.sperm.ap/index.html.
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holding if states attempted to limit coital reproduction, for example,
by mandatory sterilization or contraception, limits on the number of
children, or restrictions based on marital status and sexual orientation.
If coital reproduction is protected, then we might reasonably expect
the courts to protect the right of infertile persons to use noncoital
means of reproduction to combine their gametes, such as artificial
insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), and related techniques.
Infertile couples who use those techniques are trying to achieve the
same goal of having and rearing offspring that fertile couples achieve
through coitus. There is no good reason not to grant them the same
presumptive freedom to achieve that goal which fertile persons have,
subject to limitation, of course, if use of those techniques impaired
important state interests.2°
A somewhat harder question arises when infertile couples use the
services of a gamete donor or a surrogate to form a family. Here the
move away from the nuclear family involves a third party replacing
the genetic or gestational contribution of one of the partners. Is such
"partial" reproduction so centrally important to individuals that it
deserves the same protection? A closer look suggests that the most
widely used third-party techniques-sperm and egg donation--do
play an equally important role in the lives of persons who use them.
The use of donor gametes allows one partner to transmit genes while
the other rears only (donor sperm) or gestates and rears (egg dona-
tion). Embryo donation, which occurs less frequently, involves no
gene transmission by either partner but does create gestational and
rearing relations. Gestational surrogacy uses the gametes of each
partner but depends on gestation by a woman engaged for that pur-
pose.
If the state banned or placed substantial obstacles in the way of
gamete donation, a plausible argument would exist that such meas-
ures infringed the procreative freedom of infertile individuals or their
partners. Similar arguments could apply to embryo donation and ges-
tational or even full surrogacy, though the argument for use of gesta-
tional surrogacy might be stronger than for the other techniques. 2' If
some uses of gamete donors or surrogates are constitutionally pro-
tected, then the state could not ban them unless it could show a com-
pelling basis for doing so. 22 Any such challenge, however, would
20 In most instances, however, ARTs to have children do not cause the strong harm to oth-
ers necessary to justify limitation of the right to reproduce. See note 75, infra.
21 Embryo donation and full surrogacy are the most distantly related to ordinary coital re-
production and may have less protection than gestational surrogacy, which uses the egg and
sperm of the infertile couple.
22 Adoption also seeks to establish intimate association with a child but does not involve
[Vol. 55:2
2004] GAYAND LESBIAN ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 329
embroil the Supreme Court in yet another controversy over the reach
of substantive due process, with the same familiar arguments about
the propriety of judges reading new rights into the Constitution in-
stead of adhering closely to the content that open-ended clauses had
when they were enacted. The outcome of such cases would depend
on how closely the sought-for technique serves traditional reproduc-
tive interests and the type and strength of the interests that the state
23was trying to protect.
If the Supreme Court found that the liberty right to reproduce in-
cludes the use of ARTs when infertile, it is unlikely to limit such a
right to persons who are married. Although a state might argue that
only married persons should be aided in having children, it is also
likely to find that a person's interest in reproduction exists independ-
ently of marriage. Some persons may be unwilling or unable to
marry, yet strongly desire to be parents. As this article will explore,
unmarried persons who have children would not necessarily be poor
or inadequate childrearers, nor are children invariably harmed by be-
ing born to single or unmarried parents. 24 Justice Brennan's statement
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, "if the right to privacy means anything, it
means the right of the individual, married or single, [to] deci[de]
whether to bear or beget a child," suggests that state limits on repro-
duction by unmarried persons, such as barring access to the most
common ARTs, are likely to be struck down on due process or equal
protection grounds.2
The right to select the genetic make-up of potential offspring has
not yet received sustained attention from ART practitioners, legisla-
tures, or the courts. One could argue that the right to avoid reproduc-
tion or to reproduce necessarily entails the right to obtain genetic
procreative rights because no biologic connection with the adopted child exists. No constitu-
tional right to adopt has yet been recognized. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Fam.Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (holding that adoption and foster care relationships do not
involve liberty interests).
23 Thus techniques that involve the gametes of a married couple (gestational surrogacy)
are more likely to be granted protection than those that involve no genetic contribution at all(embryo donation). For an analysis of these issues see ROBERTSON, supra note 17; John A.Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 30 AM. J. LAW & MED. 439 (2003).
24 From a heterosexual, married perspective the situation of one parent or two parents of
the same sex raising a child may appear to be less than ideal, but one cannot say that it is solikely that such children will be harmed as to justify denying single persons or unmarried cou-
ples the chance to reproduce.
25 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). If this principle is correct, then a
law that limited assisted reproduction to married persons, such as that recently proposed in Utah
for surrogacy, is likely to be struck down. See Brooke Adams, Controversial Surrogacy Law
Fix Proposed, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 17, 2003, p. Al. available at
http://www.sltrib.com/2003/julI071 7 2 003/utah/76058.asp.
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information about embryos and fetuses and to use that information in
making decisions about embryo transfer or continuation of a preg-
nancy to term.26 If so, a state could not ban the use of amniocentesis
or preimplantation genetic screening or ban abortion or embryo trans-
fer decisions based on those tests without showing compelling rea-
sons for the ban. The strong version of such a claim would extend to
decisions based on both medical and non-medical grounds, and posit
a more general right of parents to choose the genome or other charac-
teristics of prospective children. The weak version would recognize
such a right only for medical indications. No courts, however, have
yet addressed the constitutional grounding of such claims.
1I. THE PROCREATIVE LIBERTY OF HOMOSEXUALS
Once it is recognized that both married and unmarried persons
have a liberty right to reproduce, including the right to use different
ART combinations when infertile or when necessary to ensure a
healthy offspring, there is no compelling reason for denying that right• " " n 27
to persons because of their sexual orientation . Gay males and lesbi-
ans ordinarily are not sexually attracted to members of the opposite
sex, but they may nevertheless have strong desires to have or care for
offspring.28 They too have been brought up in families and in a soci-
ety that identifies having and rearing children as an important source
of meaning and fulfillment. They have, in short, the same biologic
and associational interests as other persons do in having a child and
the same general ability to be competent child-rearers.
Yet many persons seem to find gay and lesbian reproduction to be
unnatural, an improper use of medical resources, or not in the "best
interests" of offspring. Such objections could lead to state or provider
restrictions on gay and lesbian access to assisted reproductive tech-
nologies.
26 See John A. Robertson. Prebirth Selection of Offspring Characteristics, B. U. L. REV.
301 (1996); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AMER. J. L.&
MED. 439 (2003).
27 Any legal category defined in terms of sexual orientation faces the difficult problem of
how one ascertains and establishes what that sexual orientation is. This difficulty is one more
reason for the law to avoid making distinctions on this basis. See infra discussion accompany-
ing note 59.
28 Any statement about human sexual desire must be qualified by the wide range of varia-
tion in sexual attraction and its strength, with some persons sexually attracted to members of
either sex, to same-sex others only at different periods of their life, and still others never or only
weakly so. For a discussion of the vast range of homosexual/heterosexual desire and the diffi-
culties in defining "homosexual" or "heterosexual," see EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) and
TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE: THE ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION RESEARCH, ch. 1
(1999).
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However, objections to gay and lesbian reproduction as "unnatu-
ral" or improper claim too much. The same charge can be levied
against ART itself for infertile persons (or indeed, medical interven-
tion for all illnesses). After all, if nature has not equipped people to
reproduce, then we should not interfere with nature by assisting them
to do so. If we reject that argument for the infertile (and its applica-
tion to most other illnesses), then we should reject it here as well.
The key question in each case is whether the sought-for medical
service, in this case ART for the infertile or for single persons and
gay or lesbian couples, rationally serves an important human need. If
it does for married couples, then it should for unmarried persons as
well, regardless of their sexual orientation. If so, the label of "natu-
ral" or "medical" becomes a way to hide a normative judgment about
the importance of reproduction to gay and lesbian persons that does
not withstand close scrutiny. 29 The question then becomes whether
unmarried persons, whatever their gender or sexual orientation, have
an important human interest or need in reproducing. If they do, then
they should not be excluded from ART services provided to others.
Usually, however, opponents rest their opposition to gay and les-
bian reproduction on concerns about the welfare of offspring raised
by gay or lesbian parents. In taking that position they assume, with-
out actual evidence, that a gay or lesbian sexual orientation in parents
is not good for children. State legislatures and courts have some-
times favored heterosexual over homosexual rearing parents in dis-
putes over foster parenting, adoption, and child custody involving
gays and lesbians. Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage have
argued that children are harmed by being reared by gay or lesbian
parents, and that gay marriage would encourage the birth of such chil-
dren.3°
A key question addressed in this article is whether such evidence,
even if it validly shows that rearing by gay and lesbian parents is
somewhat less favorable for children (which has not yet been reliably
29 1 am indebted to Gladys White for reminding me of the importance of this point, and to
James Hughes for his succinct statement of the same issue: "I don't see why it is any more
medical to have a husband whose sperm are funky-shaped than to have a partner who doesn't
make sperm at all."
30 Although much of the social and psychological literature shows that parenting by gay
men and lesbians presents no insuperable problems, opponents argue that this literature has
severe methodological flaws, is not a representative sample, and reflects a non-neutral agenda.
In support of the claim that children do equally well, see Charlotte J. Patterson, Family Rela-
tionships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1052, 1060, 1064-65 (2000)(reporting no significant differences). For the opposite view, see Kirk Cameron & Paul Cam-
eron, Homosexual Parents, 31 ADOLESCENCE 757, 770-74 (1996) (stating that children raised
by homosexual parents suffer from disproportionately high incidence of emotional disturbance
and sexual victimization).
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established), has relevance to the question of homosexual procreation
and access to ARTs. As is argued below, if outcomes turn out to be
less desirable for children reared by gay and lesbian parents-a
highly questionable conclusion, this argument at most might be rele-
vant to state policies about adopting existing children. But it would
have no relevance to questions of same-sex marriage, custody of a
gay person's existing children, access to ARTs, or other situations in
which a new child is brought into the world. Adoption focuses on the
best interests of already existing children and the state's goal of find-
ing optimal placements for them. Opposition to gay marriage and
access to ARTs, on the other hand, is based on protecting children
who come into being only as a result of reproduction by gays and
lesbians. 31 Harm to offspring should not be a material factor in mak-
ing such an assessment because the child sought to be protected
would not otherwise have existed.32 As a result, protecting prospec-
tive children is not a valid ground for opposing same-sex marriages or
gay and lesbian access to the assisted reproductive techniques avail-
able to others.33
IV. GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS TO REAR CHILDREN
Because much of the debate over same-sex marriage and adoption
and reproduction by gays and lesbians has focused on the welfare of
children, this article first addresses existing law about the right of
gays and lesbians to raise children. Although many studies have
shown that gays and lesbians are equally competent parents and that
their children are as well-adjusted as other children, let us assume for
the sake of argument that some reliable social and psychological stud-
ies show that children of homosexuals have a different set of adjust-
ment and living problems than children of married heterosexual per-
sons. 34 Let us also assume that there may be a higher risk of special
problems in gay families, or at least a theoretically possible chance
that such is the case.35 This is not to say that children reared in homo-
31 1 recognize that not encouraging gay reproduction is only one argument of opponents of
same sex marriage. More central has been the claim that gay marriage will diminish the mean-
ing of marriage for all persons or that recognition of same sex marriage will signal the accept-
ability of same sex behavior, and lead younger persons into gay and lesbian sexual activities.
32 This is Derek Parfit's non-identity problem. DEREK PARFIT, REASON AND PERSONS
(1984). For further discussion of the argument and the standard responses to it, see infra note
63. See also Dan Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms-The Case of Wrongful
Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995); BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE (2000).
33 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (especially Judge
Cordy's dissent).
34 See supra note 30.
35 One report suggests that children of lesbian parents might be more likely to experiment
with their sexuality and life-styles before settling in on a specific sexual orientation. Susan
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sexual settings are inescapably scarred or cannot have happy lives,
only that they may be on average somewhat less happy or somewhat
more likely to have additional complications in the personal journey
each child makes to reach a mature, stable identity. To see what the
policy implications of such evidence would be, we first examine its
relevance to policies concerning gays raising their own existing chil-
dren and policies for gay adoption.36 We then examine its relevance
to situations in which children will be born to gay and lesbian parents.
A. Rearing Existing Children
An important distinction in the analysis of the reproductive rights
of gays and lesbians is that between claims to rear existing children
and claims to bring children into the world who will be reared by gay
and lesbian parents. As we will see, if the child already exists, a bio-
logic parent who is gay or lesbian will have the same right to rear that
child as would a heterosexual parent. By contrast, although the psy-
chological and social data does not strongly support such a conclu-
sion, states may be free to deny gays and lesbians the right to be fos-
ter or adoptive parents (though few do).
In situations in which gays and lesbians seek to bring a child into
the world, claims that children are best raised in a heterosexual mar-
ried family have no logical relevance to protecting the child's welfare,
because the child in question would not otherwise have existed. As
will be discussed below, the non-identity problem in preventing harm
to future offspring strongly supports the notion that the sexual orien-
tation of parents should have no relevance to the right of gays and
lesbians to have access to assisted reproduction and to rear resulting
children.
1. Gay and Lesbian Rights to Rear Their Biologic Children
Many gays and lesbians have married opposite sex partners and
had children or otherwise coitally reproduced. When such marriages
have broken up, conflict between the couple over child custody and
Dominus, Growing Up with Mom & Mom, N.Y. TIMES Mag., Oct. 24, 2004, 69.
36 1 am bracketing out the question of whether those differences or risks are substantially
different than the many other less than ideal circumstances in which heterosexual reproduction
occurs. Much heterosexual reproduction exposes children to poverty, strife, unfavorable ge-
nomes, and many other less than ideal rearing situations, yet few efforts are made to prevent or
stop such reproduction. That fact suggests that public policy attempts to limit homosexual
reproduction on grounds of protecting offspring are in fact masking bias or antipathy toward
gays and lesbians. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558(2003) found that such bias did not provide a rational basis for governmental action.
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rearing has sometimes led one spouse to seek to deprive the gay
spouse of custody or visitation rights because that person is gay. That
partner has argued that exposure to a gay life-style is harmful to the
child, particularly if they live with or demonstrate affection with gay
partners.
In years past some courts have found this fact to be a determina-
tive factor and deprived the gay parent of custody or limited visita-
tion, especially if a new gay partner has entered the scene.37 More
recently, with few exceptions, courts have found that sexual orienta-
tion is not a per se factor in assigning child rearing.38 Instead, most
states follow a "nexus" test, under which a parent's homosexuality is
not an automatic reason for limiting custody or visitation, but could
be relevant if the other party can show that the parent's homosexual
behavior has a harmful effect on the child.39
Courts that apply the nexus test focus on aspects of the homosex-
ual parent's behavior that might be harmful to the child. One appel-
late court, for example, found that a trial court had improperly granted
a mother unsupervised visits with her children when the children had
witnessed sexual acts between the mother and her lesbian lover.4°
Such rulings, however, are not in themselves evidence of a bias
against homosexuals, since almost any court would not award custody
to heterosexual parents who openly engage in sex in front of their
children.
Courts differ on the effect of more innocent displays of affection
such as kissing and embracing by homosexual parents. In Lundin v.
Lundin,41 a Louisiana court of appeals held that the trial court should
have awarded a greater amount of custodial time to the father when
the children witnessed the mother in "indiscreet displays of affection
37 Such an approach would now most likely be unconstitutional under Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) unless a direct connection between the gay or lesbian parent's sexual orien-
tation and harmful impact on the child could be shown.
38 In Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) the Virginia Supreme Court found that living
with a homosexual parent would without a doubt harm the child. Missouri allows such a pre-
sumption to be rebutted. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998). But see Doe v. Doe,
452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. App. 1983) ("[T]he court has stressed that a parent's life-style,
standing alone, is insufficient ground for severing the natural bond between a parent and a
child.").
39 The nexus test is used by some courts explicitly, and is applied by many other courts.
See e.g., M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Supp. 1986); Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662
(Md. 1998). Charpentier v. Charpienter, 536 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1988); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628
N.E.2d 633 (I11. App. 7d. 1993).
40 See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992). The court cited a case denying
custody to a father who had a live in girlfriend, suggesting it might have been the sexual mis-
conduct in the presence of the children that influenced the court, and not the fact that the mother
was a homosexual.
41 563 So.2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990). See also M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla.
1982); Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996).
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beyond mere friendship" which included kissing with her homosexual
lover. Other courts have ruled that it is not inappropriate for children
to see the homosexual parent and the parent's lover kiss or hug.
These decisions commonly find that discreet displays of affection,
including a mother kissing her lesbian lover in front of the children,
do not harm children who are otherwise doing well. 42 They may re-
flect a growing trend.
A possible explanation for the heightened scrutiny that courts give
to homosexual parents seems to be concern for the child's develop-
ment of a normal gender identity. For example, in L. v. D. 43 a Ken-
tucky court of appeals reversed a trial court that had failed to consider
possible troubles the child might have forming a normal heterosexual
identity. The Lundin court also expressed concern about the forma-
tion of heterosexual identity. 44 However, an Illinois court of appeals
found no evidence that a child was confused because he had two
mothers, and thus refused to restrict visitation rights.45
An important factor in custody or visitation decisions with regard
to a gay person's own child is constitutional recognition of a biologic
parent's right to rear his or her own child.46 That right cannot be in-
fringed unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent is
neglecting the child, not merely whether its best interests would be
served by another rearing arrangement. Although disputes between
spouses will turn on what is best for the child, a parent could not be
denied visitation unless there was a strong basis for finding harm to
the child. Displays of affection alone between same-sex persons
should not in themselves satisfy the demanding standard that must be
met to deprive a parent of her constitutional right of association with
her offspring.
2. Adoption by Gays and Lesbians
Adoption presents a different situation because a would-be adop-
tive parent is not seeking custody of his or her own biologic child but
42 See In re Marriage of R.S. & S.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that
mother's relationship with live-in lesbian partner does not justify modification of the custody
agreement in favor of the father); VanDriel v. VanDriel, 525 N.W.2d 37 (S.D. 1994) (determin-
ing that the trial court did not abuse discretion by awarding primary custody to mother, even
though she was maintaining a lesbian relationship).
43 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
4 Lundin, 563 So.2d at 1277.
45 Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Il. App. Ct. 1993).
46 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that unmarried father was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his biological child can be adopted without his consent).
47 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring that the clear and convincing stan-
dard be met before a parent may be deprived of parental rights).
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that of someone else's already existing child.4 8 In that situation, the
best interest of the child is legitimately a paramount concern. No
recognized reproductive or other right of family liberty comes into
play, even for persons who have been acting as foster parents for a
child.49 This means that states generally have wide leeway with set-
ting the conditions for adoption. However, they are not immune from
respecting the due process and equal protection rights of gays and
lesbians in setting those conditions.
With a few exceptions, however, the question of gay and lesbian
adoption is largely moot. All states allow gay individuals to serve as
foster parents or legal guardians, and almost all permit them to adopt
as well.50 Several state appellate courts, for example, have ruled that
a potential adoptive parent's homosexuality is not a per se bar under
state law to adoption.5 1 The more relevant question is whether adop-
tion in any given case would serve the best interests of the child. Be-
cause there is no reason that gays and lesbians cannot be caring and
responsible parents, eligibility for adoption should depend upon the
parenting resources and abilities of individuals seeking to adopt, and
not on sexual orientation per se.
Florida and a few other states take a different view. AlthoughFlorida gays and lesbians may be legal guardians and foster parents,
48 Adoption of one gay partner by another to provide the same legal protections as mar-
riage is a different use of adoption not here discussed. See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW,
supra note 4, at 431-42.
49 The Supreme Court has held, for example, that foster parents are not entitled to due
process before termination of foster parenting because they have no liberty or property interest
in that relationship. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
50 See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (2003) (permitting ex-partner to
complete an independent second-paretn adoption of child bore by former partner through artifi-
cial insemination); In re M.M.D. 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (holding that unmarried, same-sex
couple was permitted to adopt a child, notwithstanding one partner's previous adoption of a
child); Adoption cf Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (holding that same sex cohabitants
are not precluded from jointly adopting a child); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d
550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (permitting lesbian to adopt her partner's biological child);
Adoptions of B.L.V.B., 6287 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that biological mother and her
lesbian partner could adopt the children of the mother); In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur.
1992) (holding that adoption by biological mother and her lesbian partner was in the best inter-
ests of the child).
5' Adoption of Anonymous, 622 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1994) (stating that homosexuality is not a
bar where there is no evidence showing adoption not in the child's best interests); In re Adop-
tion of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990); In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
52 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 1997); ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-6 (1992);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (1999) (prohibiting adoption by couples of the same gender); UTAH
CODE ANN. 378-3-1(3) (Supp. 2001) (barring adoption by unmarried cohabitants, which in-
cludes gays).
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they are barred by statute from adopting.53 This law was the fruit of a
virulent anti-gay 1977 referendum campaign led by the entertainer
Anita Bryant. While that statute had survived previous court chal-
lenges, the conclusion in Lawrence v. Texas that moral disapproval of
homosexual sodomy did not constitute a rational basis for govern-
mental action, couched as it was in language strongly protecting the
dignity and respect owed to homosexuals, appeared to have doomed
the Florida ban.
5 4
The 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, upheld the Florida
law by applying a highly deferential version of rational basis review
that ignored the values protected in Lawrence.55  The appeals panel
justified its holding as a case of appropriate deference to a legislative
judgment about what best protected the interests of adopted children.
Because there is no right to adopt as such, even for foster parents who
have long lived with a child, the court was highly deferential to the
state's claims. The state's policy to "create adoptive homes that re-
semble the nuclear family as closely as possible" was rational because
Florida has "a legitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurtur-
ing environment for the education and socialization of its adopted
children. ''56 The court found no reason to question Florida's claim
about the "vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sex-
ual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role model-
,,57ing. Disallowing adoption into homosexual households, which are
necessarily motherless or fatherless and "lack the stability that comes
with marriage," was thus a rational means of furthering Florida's in-
terest in promoting adoption by marital families.58
In reaching these conclusions, the court cast a cold eye on the
plaintiffs' claim that social science research showed that homosexuals
performed well as adoptive parents and that children raised by them
suffered no adverse outcomes. The court found that the evidence was
not so clear and overwhelming that it would be irrational for the legis-
lature to take a different view of the desirability of heterosexual rear-
53 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(d)(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) ("No person is eligible to
adopt under this statute if that person is a homosexual."). Administrative regulations define
"homosexual" as one who engages in homosexual practices, and thus does not bar non-
practicing homosexuals from adopting.
339 U.S. 558 (2003).
55 Lofton vs. Sec'y of Dept. of Children & Fam. Health Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (2004).
56 Id. at 819.
57 Id. at 804.
58 Id. Citing the long history of families as the ideal site for child rearing, the court con-
cluded that "it is in the best interests of adoptive children, many of whom come from troubled
and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in a home anchored by both a father and a mother." Id.
at 820.
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ing parents. The legislature could properly find that those studies
were not definitive because of their questionable methodologies,
small self-selected samples, political bias in how they were inter-
preted, and an over-inclusion of affluent, educated parents. 59 It cited
other studies that showed that children raised in homosexual house-
holds fared worse on a number of measures. In any event, the state
might rationally "proceed with deliberate caution before placing
adoptive children in an alternative, but unproven, family structure that
has not yet been conclusively demonstrated to be equivalent to the
marital family structure that has established a proven track record
spanning centuries."
'61
The weakness in the court's analysis is its acceptance of the many
inconsistencies and exceptions in the state's purported policy of
achieving a stable rearing environment akin to that of a married cou-
ple. The Florida statute was in fact riddled with exceptions that re-
sulted in a high degree of both over and under-inclusivity in pursuing
its stated goal. Yet in each instance the court found "some conceiv-
able basis" to rationalize the law's very loose fit with its purported
concerns. For example, despite its claim of the importance of a sta-
ble, nuclear rearing arrangement, the law did not limit adoption to
married couples. It allowed adoption by single persons as long as
they were not practicing homosexuals. Yet the court found that this
provision was "rational" because the state "might have thought" that
single heterosexuals were more likely to marry in the future than were
gays. 6 2 Also, since most adopted children are likely to be heterosex-
ual, the court found that heterosexual couples are "better positioned
than homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with educa-
tion and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout
pubescence and adolescence."
6 3
59 Id. at 825, (citing, e.g., Diana Baumrind, Commentary on Sexual Orientation: Research
and Social Policy Implications, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 130 (1995) (reviewing various
studies and questioning them on "theoretical and empirical grounds")).
60 Id. at 825, (citing, e.g., Kirk Cameron & Paul Cameron, Homosexual Parents, 31 ADO-
LESCENCE 757, 770-74 (1996) (claiming that children raised by homosexual parents suffer from
disproportionately high incidence of emotional disturbance and sexual victimization)).
61 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 826.
62 As Justice Barkett points out, it is much more likely that single individuals with adopted
children are even less likely to marry. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs.,
377 F.3d 1275, 1297-1298 (2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of Petition for Rehearing
En Banc).
63 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822. Judge Barkett found that this over-idealized the need for simi-
lar experiences to provide parenting and counseling, and that in any event, a policy of promoting
heterosexuality in offspring was not an acceptable one. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1300 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting from denial of Petition for Rehearing En Banc).
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Also damaging to the claim of rationality was the effect of the
state's policy on the children whom gays and lesbians sought to
adopt. Many of the children in question were foster children being
raised by gay or lesbian foster parents. Although Lofton and other
plaintiffs had been foster parents for many years, they could not adopt
those children, even if it would delay or make it unlikely that those
children were ever adopted. Yet the court found that the state might
rationally conclude that such delay was worth it in order to increase
the chance of finding an "optimal" placement for such children with
single or married heterosexuals. 64 Nor did the state's acceptance of
homosexuals as foster parents and legal guardians show that a ban on
adoption was irrational because those arrangements do not have the
permanence or legal and cultural significance of adoptive parenting.
The court could not reach these conclusions without a very grudg-
ing reading of Lawrence v. Texas.65 For the court, that case was
about homosexual sodomy only, not about sexual autonomy generally
or the duty to treat homosexuals with equal respect in areas beyond
sodomy. As Justice Rosemary Barkett shows in her vigorous dissent
from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, the court's read-
ing of Lawrence and other equal protection cases is very difficult to
justify. 66 As Judge Barkett shows, equal protection cases from Eisen-
stadt v. Baird through City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., and Romer v. Evans, make clear that a law that treats a disfa-
vored group differently and is so full of exceptions that it is ill-suited
to reach its goals, may be taken to be based on animus toward the
disfavored group. 67 In such cases the Court has subjected the state's
rationale to a more searching scrutiny than the "any conceivable ba-
sis" rationale used in the commercial and economic area. As she per-
suasively shows, the many exceptions in the law for heterosexuals
and even homosexuals who do not engage in homosexual acts make it
difficult to credit the notion that the law is designed to promote a sta-
ble nuclear rearing situation.
The panel's stingy reading of Lawrence is also evident in its un-
willingness to find that Florida's ban violates the right of sexual
autonomy recognized in Lawrence. The appeals court argued that
since the Lawrence majority used rational basis language and never
64 Id at 819. It also noted that if delay alone mattered, than any other requirement that de-
layed adoption, such as appropriate income, residence, in-state residency and other criteria,
would also be irrational.
65 339 U.S. 558 (2003).
66 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 804.
67 Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292-1301
(1 I th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of Petition for Rehearing En Banc).
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mentioned a fundamental right, no more general right of sexual
autonomy or homosexual status was established. As Judge Barkett
shows, however, this directly contradicts the heightened scrutiny that
Lawrence accorded to sexual intimacy. Although the opinion did not
use the language of fundamental rights, it is clear that it was applying
the heightened scrutiny that fundamental interests receive. If sexual
autonomy was not a protected liberty interest or fundamental right,
then the state's traditional concern with morality would have provided
a rational basis for the statute. Yet it is such moral judgment that the
Court found irrational when applied to homosexual sodomy.
68
If so, then a law that prohibits persons who engage in protected
sexual activity from adoption operates as a burden on the exercise of
that protected right. Although there is no right to adopt as such, once
the state authorizes adoption, it cannot condition eligibility on waiv-
ing constitutional rights of sexual intimacy or other protected liberty
interests without showing that they are substantially related to ad-
vancing the best interests of children. Although it is not irrational to
think that there might be some advantages to adopted children if
adopted by a married couple, the Florida law is not so limited. Its
many exceptions and willingness to tolerate the plight of foster chil-
dren whose adoption is delayed or never occurs makes it very difficult
to view it as anything other than a product of animus against homo-
sexuals (as its origins in the Anita Bryant campaign of 1977 sug-
gests) .69
The reluctance of the 1 P Circuit panel to strike down the Florida
ban on homosexual adoption despite Lawrence suggests that gays and
lesbians may have to continue to struggle for equal rights and status
in many areas. Although many courts might view the import of Law-
rence more broadly than did the Lofton panel, other courts have also
given Lawrence a narrow reading. VBut even parsimonious interpre-
tations of Lawrence will not change the invalidity of attempts to limit
reproduction by gays and lesbians. As we will see below, concerns
68 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). Judge Barkett is especially derisive of the
panel's claim that Lawrence is limited by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997),
claiming that Judge Birch has invented the notion that Glucksberg required that only rights that
have been affirmatively protected by history and tradition are recognizable under substantive
due process. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1304-1306 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of Petition for
Rehearing En Banc).
69 Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1301-1303.
70 See, e.g., State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kans. App. 2004) (reduced sentences for statu-
tory rape not applicable to same-sex situations); Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, 378
F.3d 1232 (11 th Cir. 2004) (finding that Lawrence does not create a fight of sexual autonomy
that invalidates state ban on sale of sexual devices). But cf. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367
(Va. 2005) (ruling that a state ban on fornication was invalid after Lawrence).
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about the well-being of children cannot serve as a rational, much less
a compelling, basis for restricting gay and lesbian reproduction be-
cause the children in question come into existence only as a result of
that reproduction.
B. Rearing Children Who Would Not Otherwise Have Existed
Debates about same-sex marriage and access to ARTs also turn on
the welfare of children, but here the situation is very different from
that of child custody or homosexual adoption. 7' Disputes about rais-
ing one's own children or adopting the children of others involve
children who already exist. Gay and lesbian procreation involve chil-
dren who will come into existence through the use of ARTs, the fre-
quency of which is likely to increase with legal recognition of domes-
tic partnerships or same-sex marriages. Opponents who argue that
gay parents are not optimal rearers cannot prevail in this context, as
the Loften court have allowed them to do in the adoption setting, be-
cause the children they seek to protect would not exist if their policies
were adopted.
Persons who cite protection of offspring to oppose same-sex mar-
riage or gay and lesbian access to ARTs have overlooked "the non-
identity problem" famously identified by Derek Parfit.72 Even if we
allow for the sake of argument that it would be preferable for all chil-
dren to be reared in a heterosexual married setting, children born with
the high likelihood of being raised outside that setting are not harmed
by that fact alone. Because the children in question would not exist
unless they were brought into the world by the gay or lesbian indi-
viduals or couples who rear them, they are not harmed simply be-
cause they have been born into what some have claimed to be less
than optimal circumstances.73 Indeed, tort law has long recognized
this point in its refusal to grant children damages for "wrongful life"
for being born in disadvantaged or diminished states of well-being
when there was no alternative way for them to have been born. 74 Pro-
71 The debate about same-sex marriage is not only about the welfare of children, but the
importance of marriage for raising children is a central part of the debate.
72 See PARFIT, supra note 32.
73 This is particularly true in a case where parents are competent and committed to the
best interests of the child, but would also be true in less ideal rearing circumstances.
74 The California, New Jersey, and Washington Supreme Courts have allowed children to
recover special but not general damages on a claim of wrongful life in situations in which their
parents were able to recover both special and general damages for the child's birth. See Turpin
v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220 (1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 470 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983). While these cases are defensible as a means to assure
that the tortfeasor internalizes the full cost of the tort, the opinions overlook the inconsistency
that exists when they allow the recovery of special but not general damages. If the child has
been wronged by being born, then such damages also should be awarded.
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tecting those children by denying them existence altogether would
thus not provide rational grounds for denying gays and lesbians the
right to marry or to procreate with ARTs.
The standard response to the non-identity problem has been to
move away from a person-based concept of harm to an evaluation of
the resulting state of affairs, regardless of whether harm to the inter-
ests of any particular individual has occurred. Derek Parfit and Dan
Brock have argued that an obligation to act to produce the best overall
state of affairs may exist when another child without those deficits
could be substituted without undue burdens to the parents." But
those conditions are not easily met in the case of gay and lesbian pro-
creation (or in most other situations of assisted reproduction).76  If
homosexual rearing carried a high risk of diminished offspring wel-
fare, then one could question the desirability of any gay and lesbian
reproduction or child rearing. Restrictions to limit reproduction,
however, impose substantial burdens on gays and lesbians seeking to
procreate. Nor would denying them the right to reproduce lead to a
married heterosexual couple having another child in the place of chil-
dren not bom in gay and lesbian families. Thus any restrictive meas-
ure fails to satisfy the stringent requirements of the same-numbers,
duty-to-substitute alternative to the non-identity problem.
To understand how the non-identity problem and procreative lib-
erty play out in the two main arenas in which concerns about the wel-
fare of offspring have strongly figured, the next sections address
same-sex marriage and gay and lesbian access to ARTs. Because
concerns about the welfare of offspring have been most directly ar-
ticulated in the debates over same-sex marriage, I begin there.
1. Same-Sex Marriage and Harm to Offspring
The current debate over same-sex marriage involves a complex ar-
ray of issues, but many of them turn on marriage as the culturally
embedded site for procreation and child-rearing, and the harms that
are alleged to arise for children if same-sex marriage is recognized.78
75 DEREK PARFIT, supra note 32 at 371-77; Dan Brock, The Non-ldentity Problem and
Genetic Harms-The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICs 269 (1995). See also Bu-
chanan, supra note 32, at 22 (detailing the ethical and technical complexities in determining the
boundaries of reproductive freedom and the transmission of harmful conditions); John A.
Robertson, Procreative Libert' and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AMER.
J.L.&MED. 7-40 (2004).
76 Robertson, supra note 75.
17 For a more extended discussion of the non-identity problem and various responses to it,
see Robertson, supra note 75.
71 As Les Green has reminded me, "same-sex" marriage rather than "gay" or "homosex-
ual" marriage is the more accurate term because there are no legal barriers to gays or lesbians
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One aspect of the debate is the claim of opponents that marriage is
quintessentially about reproduction and since same-sex couples by
definition do not reproduce with each other, marriage should be fore-
closed to them. The second aspect of the debate is that since oppo-
site-sex marriage is the most likely and appropriate site for rearing
and nurturing children, everything should be done to preserve its vi-
ability. Same-sex marriage might dilute its importance and thus lead
to children being born outside the allegedly supportive structure of
married male and female rearing parents.79
Procreation and the Essence of Marriage. It is true that society
has channelled reproduction to marriage but it has also tolerated and
permitted much reproduction to occur outside marriage. With over
half of children in the United States now born outside of marriage,
legitimacy is no longer an important social category. 80 Nor, as we
have seen, do most states award child custody or restrict adoption on
the basis of marital status or sexual orientation. 8' Most importantly,
fertility and intention to reproduce are not prerequisites to marriage;
failure to consummate the marriage or infertility are not grounds for
divorce or invalidation of a marriage. As the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court noted in its landmark upholding of the right of same-
sex marriage, even "people who cannot stir from their deathbed may
marry. ,82 The court found that the essence of marriage is permanent
commitment to a personal relationship, not procreation. Although
many married persons do have children, "it is the exclusive and per-
manent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the
begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage. ' 83
marrying persons of the opposite sex.
79 The procreation argument against same-sex marriage was nicely summarized in a letter
to the editor of the New York Times commenting on a Massachusetts court decision in favor of
same-sex marriage:
The key reason for giving special consideration to marriage is its unique role in the
procreation and education of children, which is impossible with "gay
unions. Drug abuse, crime, poverty and educational difficulties are reduced
when children are raised by a mother and a father. Traditional marriage is in enough
trouble today without further adding the absurdity and degradation of 'gay unions' to
its problems.
Frank J. Russo, Jr., Letters, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A24 (the writer is identified as
the state director of the American Family Assocation of New York).
80 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 52 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
REPORTS 8-9 (2003) (reporting that 34% of all births in the United States in 2002 were to un-
married women, a figure which has slowly increased in recent years).
81 See supra note 50.
82 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941,961 (Mass. 2003).
83 Id. at 961.
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Protection of Offspring. The second way in which procreation
figures in the same-sex marriage debate is over claims about the wel-
fare of future children. Opponents claim that same-sex marriage will
end up hurting children by leading to more of them being born in
same-sex households or to non-married heterosexuals. The first will
result from the encouragement which marriage will give to gays and
lesbians to have offspring. The second from the dilution of the attrac-
tiveness of the married state to heterosexuals, leading to more chil-
dren born to heterosexuals outside of marriage.
This claim has both an empirical and a conceptual basis. Empiri-
cally, the question is whether children reared in same-sex marriages
would fare as well as children who are reared in opposite-sex marital
settings. The argument that they would not fare as well is based on
the long history and social importance of the institution, the lack of
clear studies to the contrary, and an innate conservative opposition to
change in such a fundamental social institution. However, even if
there are advantages to children of having opposite-sex parents, it is
unclear how great the disadvantages of gay or same-sex rearing
would be. Given the importance of marriage to the individuals seek-
ing it, a higher threshold of difference should be required to justify
withholding marriage because of a fear that children may not be
reared as effectively in same-sex or non-marital opposite-sex fami-
lies .84
But even if clear rearing advantages could be shown, it does not
follow that resulting children are so harmed that the state is justified
in stopping gays and lesbians from reproducing or from marrying a
same-sex partner because of the risk to the welfare of offspring. Be-
cause the children would not otherwise have been born, they are not
harmed by being born to same-sex married persons or to unmarried
heterosexuals. Nor is the degree of disadvantage so great that it raises
questions about the procreative rationality or good faith of an individ-
ual or couple interested in the welfare of their children. 85 Thus pro-
tecting the children who would otherwise not be born is not a compel-
ling or even rational basis for banning same-sex marriage.
Indeed, the irrationality of denying gays and lesbians the right to
marry their partners to protect offspring is heightened by the impact
of a same-sex marriage ban on children who will be born to gays and
lesbians regardless of whether they are married. Although same-sex
84 The Goodridge majority did not reach the question of fundamental rights, while the dis-
sents found there was no fundamental right to marry that extended to same sex-marriage. A
commitment view of marriage, however, would argue for finding that it is a fundamental right,
or altematively, that a ban on same sex-marriage reflected bias and served no rational basis.
85 See Robertson, supra note 75, at 21.
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marriage might encourage more gays and lesbians to have children,
gays and lesbians will have offspring regardless of whether same-sex
marriage is recognized. In denying same-sex marriages the state
would also be denying the children of gay and lesbian partnerships
the permanency of commitment, stability, and federal and state finan-
cial and other benefits that come with marriage.
The impact on children born to gay couples was a major reason for
the court's finding in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that
the state's ban on same-sex marriage was not rationally related to its
legitimate goal of protecting the interest of children. The majority
found:
Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not
make children of opposite sex marriages more secure, but it
does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of "a
stable family structure in which children will be reared, edu-
cated, and socialized."
In this case, we are confronted with an entire, sizeable class
of parents raising children who have absolutely no access to
civil marriage and its protections because they are forbidden
from procuring a marriage license. It cannot be rational un-
der our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize chil-
dren by depriving them of State benefits because the State
disapproves of their parents' sexual orientation. 86
The dissents, on the other hand, most notably that of Judge Cordy,
vigorously argued that same-sex marriage was more likely to harm
rather than help children because it would lead to more children being
born and reared in less desirable circumstances by same-sex couples
and unmarried heterosexuals. According to him, the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of future children thus met the rational basis
standard that legislation banning same-sex marriage had to meet.
But even if Judge Cordy is correct that married heterosexual rear-
ing has advantages over alternatives, there are two conceptual mis-
takes in his reasoning. The first is his claim that banning same-sex
marriage will protect the children who would have been born if same-
sex marriage were permitted. This position ignores the non-identity
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problem. As we have seen, it protects those children by preventing
them from being born at all, which is hardly a benefit from their per-
spective once they are born. 87  Even if being reared by married het-
erosexual parents may have certain advantages, it is not possible for
those children to be born to opposite-sex married parents.88  Because
they have no other way to exist, they are neither harmed nor wronged
by being born and reared by same-sex parents. 89 A policy that would
protect those children by preventing their birth altogether is no pro-
tection for them at all. 90
The second mistake is Judge Cordy's ignoring the reality that
same-sex partners will have children regardless of whether same-sex
marriage is permitted. If the legislature is truly concerned for those
children, it should extend to them the same substantial benefits that
the children of opposite-sex married couples receive. No rational
basis exists for not treating the children of same-sex couples the same
as the children of opposite-sex couples.9' To treat those children
similarly, it should extend to them the same rights and privileges that
children of opposite-sex marriage receive, and permit their parents to
marry.
Some opponents of same-sex marriage might argue that permitting
gays and lesbians to enter into "civil unions" that accord many of the
same benefits as marriage would adequately protect children, and thus
allow "marriage" to be retained for opposite-sex unions only.
Whether state recognition of "civil unions" would accord full equality
to the children of same-sex partners would depend on whether federal
social security law also recognized that status. If it did, then whether
the label of "civil union" or "marriage" were used would be less im-
87 The question of harm must be asked from the perspective of persons once they are born
because until they are born, there is no person in existence with rights or interests to be pro-
tected. See Robertson, supra note 75.
18 Transferring custody of them after birth for rearing by heterosexual married couples
would not in most cases be feasible. Even if it were, it would exact a substantial burden from
the parents, and one that under Stanley v. Illinois would almost certainly be unconstitutional.
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (declaring the right of a father to have custody of his illegitimate children).
89 Indeed, even if rearing by same-sex couples is not optimal, those children will still have
rich and rewarding lives, and will generally be raised by loving parents who provide excellent
care, as Judge Cordy's dissent repeatedly recognizes. Goodridge, 748 N.E.2d at 1003 (Cordy,
J., dissenting). He also rejects sexual orientation as a basis for child custody or adoption deci-
sions based on the best interests of the child.
90 Nor is it possible to easily substitute married heterosexual parents for those children,
because they would not otherwise be born, thus foreclosing a same-numbers substitution ap-
proach to the non-identity problem. See Robertson, supra note 75.
91 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that illegal alien children cannot be
barred from public education because of the illegal acts of their parents). Denying the children
of gay parents the benefits of marriage in effect punishes them for the "sins" of their parents.
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portant to the interests of the child than to the equal status of gays and
lesbians who seek to marry their partners.92
2. Gay and Lesbian Procreation and Harm to Offspring
Reproduction by gays and lesbians raises directly the issue of harm
to offspring that arises indirectly in the same-sex marriage context.
Opponents of gay and lesbian procreation would argue that if rearing
by same-sex or homosexual parents is not optimal, then facilitating
gay and lesbian procreation will lead to more children being born and
reared in less than optimal settings. Although the difference in wel-
fare between the two settings might not justify direct limitations on
coital reproduction by gays and lesbians, it does provide a sufficient
basis for barring access to the ARTs needed to procreate.93
The flaw in this position, however, is the non-identity problem-
that the children sought to be protected by banning gay and lesbian
access to ARTs will not then be born. Because a life with a gay or
lesbian parent is still a meaningful life, those children are hardly pro-
tected by preventing their birth altogether.94 Protecting the welfare of
children born to gay parents would thus not satisfy a rational basis,
much less a compelling interest, test for interfering with the procrea-
tive liberty of gay and lesbian persons who wish to reproduce. As a
result, the state could not legitimately pass laws that prohibit or sub-
stantially burden gay and lesbian reproduction, regardless of whether
it occurs coitally or as the result of assisted reproduction.
As with other fundamental rights, however, the state is not obli-
gated to fund those procedures nor to prohibit private actors from
refusing to treat or offer ART services to gay and lesbians because of
their personal objection to such life-styles or their unwillingness to
facilitate a rearing situation that they perceive as sub-optimal or unde-
sirable. State and federal civil rights laws prohibit discrimination in
private medical services because of the race, religion, ethnicity, or
disability of the patient. In most cases, however, the ban on imper-
missible discrimination does not include sexual orientation, leaving
private providers free to deny ART services on the basis of discrimi-
92 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.) (ruling that a civil
union with all the same benefits and privileges as civil marriage is unconstitutional because it
denigrates gays and treats them differently without a rational basis for the difference).
93 Many nations prohibit the provision of ART services to persons who are not married,
thus implicitly barring services to gays and lesbians. See Lynn D Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 n.8 (1996) (listing
Scandinavian countries that forbid adoption of ARTs by homosexual domestic partners).
94 As noted earlier, the claim that policy should be based on overall, not individual, wel-
fare overlooks the difficulty of meeting the duty-to-substitute alternative to the non-identity
problem.
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natory criteria that the state could not act on. An important policy
issue is whether IVF providers should retain the freedom to discrimi-
nate against such patients. A more complete discussion of these is-
sues follows.
V. ACCESS TO ARTS
We have seen that all persons have the liberty right to procreate
and presumably to use ARTs to do so, including the use of donor
gametes and gestational surrogacy, and possibly preconception and
prenatal screening techniques as well. Harm to future offspring from
the nature of the technique or the non-marital status or sexual orienta-
tion of the parents is not a sufficient basis for state action denying
persons the right to reproduce either coitally or with medical assis-
tance.
With this background, we now examine the different settings and
situations in which gays and lesbians seek ART services to procreate.
The legal questions and conflicts that arise in that arena depend on the
technique at issue and whether it is sought by homosexual men or
women. One set of issues is the legal availability of the techniques
that serve the reproductive needs of gays and lesbians. A second set
concerns-the scope of physician autonomy in selecting patients. A
third set involves the rearing rights and duties of gay and lesbian in-
dividuals and partners in those arrangements. As we will see, the
main obstacles to gay and lesbian reproduction are not legal bars as
such, but rather rights of fertility doctors to choose their patients, un-
certainties about rearing rights and duties, and the lack of resources
needed-to pursue ART options.
A. Legal Availability of ART Techniques
Gay and lesbians seeking to have offspring could benefit from a
variety of ART techniques, including Al or IVF with donor sperm,
donor sperm and egg donation, embryo donation, and surrogacy.95
Although no state directly bars gay and lesbian access to such tech-
niques, it is nonetheless informative to address the constitutional
status of access to such techniques if legal bars were enacted.
95 I exclude from discussion arrangements in which another woman has agreed to produce
a child, whether through intercourse or with an ART, that will be relinquished at birth to the
person hiring her. Persons who commission the birth of a child in this way are not exercising
their own procreative liberty, and no right to acquire a child by adoption has been recognized as
part of family autonomy. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998); ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 142-144 (1994) (liberty to use donors and surrogates does
not require recognition of a right to arrange an adoption prior to birth).
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1. Artificial Insemination of Gay Single Women or Couples
Perhaps the most common instance of non-coital gay procreation
involves single women or coupled gay women who request artificial
insemination (AI) to have a child. While some gay women prefer to
self-inseminate with sperm obtained from donor friends or purchased
from sperm banks, others seek the services of physicians. Precise
numbers do not exist, but it is widely assumed that several thousand
children are born each year from physician insemination of single
women and lesbian couples.
No laws prohibit artificial insemination of single women, whether
lesbian or straight, to enable them to have a child. If they did, they
would be vulnerable to constitutional attack as interference with an
unmarried woman's right to procreate by preventing her from con-
ceiving non-coitally. 96  Protecting prospective children would not
count as a compelling justification for infringing procreative liberty
because the children sought to be protected would not otherwise be
born, and at worse would suffer a sub-optimal, not directly harmful,
rearing situation.97
Whether ART clinics may deny services to single women or les-
bian couples turns on whether the clinic is a state or private actor.98
If the clinic is a state entity, for example, a state medical school or
hospital, it will be bound by the requirements of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process and equal protection. Although the state is not ob-
ligated to provide ART services, if it does, it would need a rational
basis for denying some persons access to those services while grant-
ing them to others. For example, if a state university medical center
provided Al with donor sperm or egg donation to married couples, it
arguably could not refuse to provide those services to unmarried indi-
viduals, regardless of their sexual orientation. Disapproval of single
parenthood or homosexuality would not provide such a justification. 99
Nor, under the analysis of this article, would protection of children
who would not otherwise have been born be a sufficient basis for the
unequal treatment of persons seeking those procedures. t00
96 If the state could not prohibit a single woman from engaging in sexual intercourse in
order to conceive, then a ban on AT for that purpose should also be unconstitutional.
97 Strictly speaking, the non-identity problem applies whether the resulting situation is
merely "sub-optimal" or "directly harmful" because the child sought to be protected would not
exist if the event causing the directly harmful condition did not occur. For further discussion of
this point, see Robertson, supra note 75.
98 It also turns on whether state or federal legislation prevents discrimination in public ac-
commodations on that basis.
99 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
could also be interpreted to add some support to such a claim. But see Lofton, supra at note 20.
100 Several instances of refusal to treat gay women have been reported, but none has led to
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2. AI and Egg Donation to a Lesbian Couple
Some single women or lesbian couples wish to combine egg dona-
tion with Al from a donor. This may be necessary because of the
infertility of the gestating partner. In other cases it is a way for both
partners to have a biologic relationship with the child, with one pro-
viding the egg and the other the gestation, thus making them both
biologic parents. In the future if cytoplasmic transplants prove to be
safe and effective, the one providing only gestation may also be able
to provide cytoplasm to her partner's egg as a way to gain some addi-
tional shared genetic connection. 101
As is the case with Al and other ARTs, no laws prohibit egg dona-
tion to single or lesbian women or regulate the fees that can be paid to
donors. Such prohibitions would most likely be unconstitutional, as
would be the refusal by state entities that provide egg donation to
married women to provide them to single or gay women. While regu-
lation of egg donation to ensure the health and safety of donors would
be permissible, limits on the fees that can be paid to egg donors
would raise constitutional issues if they prevented infertile women
from obtaining the gametes they needed to reproduce.10 2
3. Surrogacy for Gay Males
Some gay males now want to have their own child either as a sin-
gle parent or with a same-sex partner. Brokering agencies in Califor-
nia, Boston, Washington, D.C., and Florida have assisted gay males
to have offspring. 10 3 To do so, they will have to find women who will
bear the child for them. In some cases the surrogate will also provide
the egg (full surrogacy). In other cases one woman will donate the
egg which is fertilized with the sperm of one of the gay male partners
and another woman will gestate the child (gestational surrogacy).
Because a surrogate mother is essential for gay male reproduction
to occur, some persons might suggest that the law ban such arrange-
litigation. Some staff members at the University of Washington Hospital were "uncomfortable"
treating lesbian women, and refused. As a state institution, the University determined that it
could not discriminate on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation and declared a policy
of equal access. The staff who objected had to comply or seek other employment.
101 See John A. Robertson, Reconstituting Eggs: The Ethics of Cytoplasm Donation, 71
FERTILITY & STERILITY 219, 221 (1999) (discussing the ethics of cytoplasm donation).
102 This argument assumes that a person's right to procreate includes the right to engage
the assistance of a donor or surrogate when necessary for them to have a genetically or gesta-
tionally related child. If such a right exists, then some bans on payment might infringe that right
without sufficient justification.
103 Sandra G. Broodman, Fatherhood by a New Formula, WASHINGTON POST, January 18,
2005, Fl.
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ments. But if surrogacy in either form is available to married persons,
then it should be available to unmarried persons as well. The strong-
est case for a constitutional right to use a gestational surrogate to re-
produce would arise if a married couple is able to produce gametes
but the wife is unable to gestate the embryo and thus needs the ser-
vices of a surrogate gestator to have genetically related offspring.
The argument is weaker when the wife can provide neither an egg or
gestation because she has no genetic or physical link with the result-
ing child. Such an arrangement, however, is necessary for her hus-
band to reproduce. Thus he may have the right to engage a full surro-
gate, even if his infertile wife does not.
If a right of a married couple to use a surrogate to reproduce were
recognized, then such a right should exist as well for a single person,
regardless of that individual's gender or sexual orientation. If single
persons have a right to reproduce coitally with a willing partner, then
they should also have the right to use an ART (including surrogacy)
to procreate, regardless of their sexual orientation.1°4 A law banning
such uses would interfere with their procreative liberty. Protection of
offspring would not provide a rational justification because the chil-
dren in question would not otherwise have been born, and in any
event, will have a meaningful and rewarding life even if reared by
their father alone or with a gay partner. If disapproval of homosexu-
ality itself is not a valid basis for governmental action, then a state
clinic would not be free to offer surrogacy or ART services to hetero-
sexual persons but not homosexuals.'
0 5
No state makes either full or gestational surrogacy itself a crime,
but 15 states limit payments to surrogates for their services. 0 6  In
some cases state prohibitions on paying fees to relinquish a child for
adoption could limit surrogacy payments. If these laws substantially
burdened the ability to obtain the gametes or gestational services
needed to have a biologically related offspring, they could in theory
'
04 A single woman might need a gestational surrogate if she can produce an egg. Simi-
larly, a man with viable sperm would need the services of a full surrogate or those of an egg
donor and a gestational surrogate to have offspring. Note that the claim of a single person to
reproduce would not exist if they are providing neither genes or gestation to the arrangement.
105 If the clinic bars all unmarried persons, it may be a different matter. The question there
is whether preferring that the child have married parents provides a substantial justification for
denying unmarried persons access.
1°6ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-218 (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. 16-402 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 742.15 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. 31-20-1-2 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
199.590(4) (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMp. LAWS
722.859 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. 25-21,200 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 168-B:16 (2001);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE 14-18-05 (2004); UTAH
CODE ANN. 76-7-204 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. 20-162 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
26.26.240 (West 1997).
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be viewed as infringing a gay male (or infertile couples's) right to
procreate. 0 7 With little precedent yet on this issue, it is unclear, how-
ever, whether such a challenge would succeed.
A more important factor than sexual orientation in providing ART
services to enable single men to reproduce is whether the man is situ-
ated to provide the nurturing and support needed by the child.'0 8 The
same question about child-rearing capabilities can be raised about
single or coupled gay women and, indeed, about married couples as
well. Yet the willingness to be more concerned about that issue with
single males or gay male couples suggests the influence of stereo-
types about the different child-rearing abilities of males and females.
Gender stereotypes have long viewed women as child-rearers and
men as providers. With those stereotypes no longer sufficient to jus-
tify depriving women of opportunities available to men, they should
not be used to justify depriving men of opportunities available to
women. 109
Fertility centers are generally free to refuse to provide ART ser-
vices to individuals or couples whom they think will not make re-
sponsible parents." l0 But they should have good reason for doing so
beyond sex-based stereotypes about males as child-rearers. Just as
most single women who seek to have children are likely to be nurtur-
ing and caring child-rearers, single men who seek to reproduce with a
surrogate are likely to be as well. It is reasonable for ART programs
to inquire into the rearing capabilities in all their patients, and choose
not to provide ART services to single males or females, whatever
their sexual orientation, if they have grounds for thinking that the
person will not be a suitable parent. In that case they would deny
ART services on grounds of ability to rear, not on grounds of sexual
orientation."' To be consistent, they should apply the same criteria to
single women and to married couples.' 12
107 That argument would turn on whether bans on payment prevent persons from reproduc-
ing and whether payment threatened interests in preventing coercion and exploitation. See John
A. Robertson, Surrogate Motherhood and the Ethics of Collaborative Reproduction HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT, 13:13-17 (1983).
108 What if the program offers the service to single women and not single men? Is there
any reason to think that women are more naturally inclined to be good child-rearers?
'0gSee Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996).
t10 THE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE,
Child-rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564,
567 (2004).
111 Strictly speaking, because of the non-identity problem children born to persons who are
inadequate rearing parents but who will retain custody will not have been harmed by that birth.
But private providers may not wish to facilitate such an arrangement. See Robertson, supra note
75.
1 2 To ensure that patients have not underestimated the burdens of raising a child as a sin-
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In making these assessments some programs might prefer to pro-
vide services to couples rather than individuals. Such programs might
be more likely to find that child-rearing will be more ably done by a
gay male or female couple rather than a single male or female. Here
there are two people to share the challenges and demands of child-
rearing. If they have joined in a civil union, a marriage, or a perma-
nent partnership, they are also likely to have a stable relationship that
is conducive to a rich and rewarding life for their child.
It is also likely that some fertility programs do not offer ART ser-
vices to gay males because of the added complications which involv-
ing a surrogate carrier entail."l 3 Not all fertility programs will partici-
pate in surrogacy arrangements, even if they do provide IVF, Al, and
egg and embryo donation services. Many of such programs may be
willing to treat lesbians, but then draw the line at gay males because
of the program's desire to avoid the complications of surrogacy.
B. Professional Autonomy in Selecting Patients as a Barrier
With few state laws directly limiting access to assisted reproduc-
tion, a more important factor in regulating gay and lesbian reproduc-
tion is the willingness of physicians and ART clinics to treat them.
Currently, about 80% of ART clinics in the United States provide Al
and related services to single women and lesbian couples, while only
about 20% provide services to male individuals or couples. While
most gay males and lesbians who have sought ART services probably
have been able to receive them, some have not, and others have had
more difficulty in doing so than married couples or single women and
lesbian couples.
Any effort to restrict physician autonomy in this area must con-
front the wide discretion that physicians have traditionally had over
whom they treat. Ordinarily, physicians are free or not to accept a
person as a patient. However, once having accepted a person as a
patient, the physician has a duty not to abandon the patient. The duty
of non-abandonnment means that the physicians must use reasonable
care in treating patients and must give patients whom they no longer
wish to treat adequate opportunity to find another physician.
gle parent, counseling prior to conception would be helpful. In one instance an ART program
inseminated a surrogate mother hired by a young single male who would rear the child on his
own. The man grossly underestimated the challenges of a new baby, could not tolerate the
crying of a colicky baby, and murdered the child a month after its birth.
1
13 Communication with Dr. Paula Amato, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Tx.
(January 7, 2005).
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There are two legal limitations on the right of physicians not to ac-
cept a person as a patient-one constitutional and one statutory. If
the physician is a state employee or providing services in a state facil-
ity, he or she would be bound by constitutional duties of due process
and equal protection, and most likely, after Lawrence v. Texas and
Romer v. Evans, would not be free to deny services to persons be-
cause of their sexual orientation or marital status.l"4 A claim that they
were doing so to protect potential children from being reared by
same-sex or single parents would not pass constitutional muster.
If the physician is a not a government employee or not otherwise
considered a state actor, he or she would retain discretion to choose
among patients as long as he or she does not discriminate on grounds
deemed impermissible in state or federal civil rights laws."t5 These
laws typically restrict discretion in providing medical services and
other public accommodations on grounds of race, religion, sex, eth-
nicity, and disability, though 15 states include sexual orientation as an
impermissible ground.' 16 Accordingly, private ART providers not in
those jurisdictions would retain discretion over whether to provide
services to single persons and couples regardless of their sexual orien-
tation. Even if this discretion has not prevented many gays and lesbi-
ans from obtaining ART services, it has made it more costly or diffi-
cult in some circumstances, and may lead to additional barriers in the
future.
Given the key role that physicians play as gatekeepers to the use of
ARTs, some persons have argued that both professional ethics and
public policy should prohibit physicians from denying services based
on marital status or sexual orientation. According to this argument,
this ground for discrimination is not rationally related to a legitimate
non-discriminatory purpose and the sought-for services are of great
importance to the individual denied them. ART programs would still
have some flexibility in what services they offer, but if they provide
donor gametes or gestational surrogacy to married couples or hetero-
sexuals, then they cannot justifiably deny it to single persons or gay
and lesbian couples.17
114539 U.S. 558 (2003); 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
115 This is true under federal law and the law of most states.
116 CAL. CIV. CODE 51 (West Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. 46a-81d (2004); D.C. CODE
ANN. 2.1402.31 (Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. 368-1 (Michie 1993); Illinois SB3186, sent to
Governor on 1/19/05; MD. CODE ANN. 49B, § 5 (2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (West
2000); MINN. STAT. 363A.02 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 354-A:1 (Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 10:5-4 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. 28-1-7 (Michie Supp. 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296 (McKinney 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-24-2 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502 (1993 &
Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. § 66.0125 (2003).
117 The claim that treating gay males is more complicated because an egg donor and/or sur-
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The counterargument draws both on the importance of profes-
sional choice, the nature of the services sought, and the developing
but still unformed clear consensus about the rights and status of un-
married persons and gays and lesbians with regard to reproduction.
Opponents of a physician's duty to provide ARTs regardless of mari-
tal status or sexual orientation would argue that just as state con-
science clause laws protect a health-care provider's right not to par-
ticipate in abortion, so physicians with moral objections should not
have to assist gays and lesbians in conceiving and having children. 1 8
Unlike refusing treatment to persons with HIV or an acute illness,
ARTs are not essential for the patient's life or health and other willing
providers are usually available.' 19 Nor does imposition of such a duty
recognize the importance of a professional's sense of his or her own
role or purpose in practicing medicine. 20 Given the strength of these
competing arguments, it is likely that private physicians in many
states will retain professional discretion to refuse to provide ART
services to gays or lesbians.
C. Rearing Rights and Duties in Children After Assisted
Reproduction
More important than direct state bans or professional barriers to
gays and lesbians using ARTs to reproduce are uncertainties about
their rearing rights and duties in children resulting from these ar-
rangements. Because society has not yet fully resolved family and
parenting relationships from the use of gamete donors and surrogates,
rogate is involved and thus need not be provided is not necessarily persuasive. See infra note
120.
118AIl states but Alabama, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Connecticut have laws pro-
tecting health care workers who object to providing or assisting in abortions. See, e.g.. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8) (West 2004);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (Anderson 2004). See also the developing right of pharma-
cists to refuse to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception or birth-control pills. Julie
Cantor and Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection-May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill
Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008 (2004); Charisse
Jones, Druggists Refuse to Give Out Pill. Say Their Religion Forbids the Use of Contracep-
tives, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2004, p. 3A.
1 9 This is especially true given that providers willing to offer the service are usually avail-
able, though lesbians seeking ARTs will have more options than gay males for alternative
providers.
'
20 A physician who is willing to use an egg donor and surrogate for a gay or single woman
but not for a gay or single man describes the difference as helping the woman "replace some-
thing that she should have had the opportunity to do on her own, but for whatever biological
reason (ovarian failure or hysterectomy) cannot. A male, on the other hand, can never produce
eggs or carry a child, so there is nothing 'malfunctioning' for him. This may not hold water, but
it makes sense for me." Interview with Anonymous Physician, May 16, 2004.
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this uncertainty applies to the use of ARTs by married persons as
well. I focus here, however, on issues of rearing rights and duties as
they directly affect gays and lesbians.
1. Donor Sperm
With single women and lesbian couples using artificial insemina-
tion with donor sperm more frequently than other techniques, the laws
governing rearing rights and duties after the use of donor sperm are
directly relevant to lesbian reproduction. 121 More developed than the
law for other forms of gamete donation and surrogacy, the law of
sperm donation has been written for the most part from the perspec-
tive of a married couple with severe male infertility. Most states have
statutes or court decisions upholding the exclusion of the donor from
any rearing rights and duties in the resulting child in the context of
donation to a married couple when the husband provides written con-
sent to the donation. 122  Most of these statutes do not directly address
the rearing rights and duties of donors in non-marital situations,
though a few do so if a physician performs the insemination.1
23
In the absence of statutory resolution of rearing questions, a strong
argument exists for an intention-based solution to disputes over rear-
ing rights and duties. An agreement to exclude the donor from rear-
ing rights is most likely to be given effect. Indeed, if a donor has not
asserted a claim to rearing shortly after birth, he may be estopped
from asserting a claim for paternity at a later time. If he does assert
such a claim and can establish paternity, a written agreement relin-
quishing parental rights could well be given effect. However, if there
is no such agreement or if the parties have not used a physician for
the insemination, a sperm provider may retain paternal rights over
offspring.
124
121 They are also relevant to gay male reproduction, but in those cases there is no intention
to donate sperm to the woman who provide the eggs and/or gestates. Rather, it is to use her
services to have a child.
122 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(2004); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004); COLO.
REV STAT. § 19-4-106 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13 § 8-703 (2004); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN § 38-1114 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56
(West 2003); Mo. ANN STAT. § 210.824 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2004);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN § 40-11-6 (Michie 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-02.1, 14-17-04 (2004); OHIO
REV. CODE § 3111.95 (Anderson 2004); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 26.26.710 (2004); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-903 (Michie 2004).
23 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004).
124 To ensure that those rights are extinguished, single women should obtain sperm through
a sperm bank and have it administered by a physician. If the donor is not obtained from a sperm
bank but is a known individual, it is essential to formalize the arrangement so that he may not
later claim parenthood. A written donation agreement is essential, but may not guarantee the
intended result. Several painful cases have arisen over misunderstandings of what each party
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The most litigated issue arising from lesbian use of donor sperm
concerns the rearing rights and duties of a non-gestational partner
who has jointly undertaken with the mother to have and rear a child.
In many instances of lesbian procreation both partners agree to share
parenting equally but only one is inseminated and gestates. If the
partners later separate, the law in most states regards only the woman
who gives birth as a parent with rearing rights and duties, and accords
the non-gestating partner no parental status at all. 125  While this dis-
position has most frequently barred the non-reproducing partner from
having visitation or custodial rights, it has also been used to prevent
the imposition of support duties on the non-reproducing partner. 26
In most states, however, the non-gestating partner may become a
parent through a step-parent adoption. 27 Both New York and Massa-
chusetts, for example, deny rights to the non-gestating partner from
the parties' agreement, but allow that partner to become a parent
through a step-parent adoption. 28 One of the benefits to offspring of
same-sex marriage mentioned in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health is the added stability that comes from defining parenthood at
birth and eliminating the need for such cumbersome alternatives as
adoption to create the needed stability. Until that adoption occurs,
however, the non-gestating partner may have no certainty that she
will or will not be legally recognized as a parent with rearing rights
and duties, whatever agreements the two women have made concern-
ing rearing rights and duties in the child.129
Two cases have recently recognized the non-biologic partner as a
parent in cases in which joint rearing was intended. In one a Califor-
nia appellate court has read the requirement in its Uniform Parentage
Act to apply "as far as practicable the provisions that are applicable to
establishing a father and child relationship ... to determine the exis-
tence of a mother-child relationship" as establishing the non-gestating
envisaged. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., No. A0278210 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1986); C.M. v
C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1977). To avoid them it is essential that the
arrangement be formalized by a notarized document or even by a formal termination of parental
rights by the donor. Although not all states officially recognize single person adoption, state
courts in later disputes are more likely to follow the donation model followed with heterosexu-
als and married couples.
125 See In re Pamela P., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
126 T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E. 2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (stating that in the absence of legislation,
parenthood by contract is not recognized).
127 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271
(Vt. 1993); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 320 (Mass. 1994); In re Adoption of Two Chil-
dren by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. 1995). However, states that bar adoption by homo-
sexuals or by unmarried persons would bar adoption in those cases.
128 Cf In re Pamela P., 443 N.Y.S. 2d 343; see cases cited supra note 127.
129 See T.F. v. B.L., 2004 WL 1879513 (Mass. 2004)
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partner as a parent without a step-parent adoption.130  In the second
case an Indiana appellate court held that because the couple had
agreed to bear and raise a child together by insemination of one of the
partners with donor sperm, both women are legal parents of the re-
sulting child. 131 If these decisions survive appeals, they will show an
increased state willingness to rely on the intention of the parties in
determining rearing rights and duties in ART offspring.
2. Egg and Embryo Donation
Little legislation exists concerning the rearing rights and duties of
participants in other situations involving gamete donors and surro-
gates. Five states have passed legislation to specify rearing rights and
duties in egg donation, and two in embryo donation. 32 Paralleling the
treatment of sperm donation to a married couple, the few egg and
embryo donation statutes on the books sever the egg donor's rearing
rights and duties in resulting children when she has relinquished those
rights at the time of donation, making the recipient gestational mother
the sole legal mother. A few courts have given effect to such inten-
tions in non-statutory states. As similar disputes arise in other states,
the courts are increasingly likely to follow an intention-based, con-
tractual approach that intends to have the gestational mother the sole
legal mother. Presumably such agreements would also protect the
egg donor from attempts to impose on her child support or other rear-
ing duties.
These rules would also apply to situations in which one of the les-
bian partners provides the egg and the other the gestation to produce a
child with donor sperm. Although no case law yet exists on the sub-
ject, the courts are likely to give great weight to the reliance and un-
derstanding of the parties at the time of the donation. 33 If the parties
have agreed that the donor will retain some rearing rights as well as
the gestator that result is likely to control. Any doubts could be alle-
viated by a step-parent adoption by the egg donor.
The importance of the intentions of the parties at the time of pro-
viding the egg is highlighted in a California case that barred an egg
donor who had relinquished rearing rights to her partner but then
jointly reared the child for several years from recognition as a legal
'
30 Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 2004 WL 1465100 (Cal. Ct. App.).
131 In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004).
132 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1995);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (West Supp. 1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102 (West
Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1995).
133 John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human
Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 18 (1988-89).
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parent of the child. 34 Two women in a long-term relationship de-
cided to have a child. After several attempts at artificial insemination
of one of them, the treating physician suggested that they use the non-
inseminated partner as an egg donor. The egg provider signed a con-
sent form provided by the fertility program that said that she relin-
quished all rearing rights and duties in any resulting children to her
partner. After rearing the resulting child together for two years, the
parties separated. When the biologic mother denied the rearing part-
ner further access to the child, that partner sued. Despite her claim
that she did not intend to waive her rearing rights in providing the
egg, the court held that her agreement together with other evidence
about the intention of the parties showed that she had relinquished
those rights and denied her legal parenthood.'35
3. Gay Males and Surrogacy
Although single women and lesbian couples may on occasion en-
gage a surrogate to enable them to have a genetically related child,
single males or gay male couples have no way to reproduce unless a
woman, who is usually paid for her services, agrees to be inseminated
or have an embryo created with the male's sperm and an egg provided
by an egg donor transferred to her uterus. The intent in such ar-
rangements ordinarily is to have the woman who bore the child have
no role in rearing it.
One set of legal issues concerns whether the surrogate retains any
rearing rights and duties in such cases, even if she agreed to relin-
quish her parental rights at birth. In the famous case of Baby M.,
which involved a full surrogate, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
fused to enforce such an agreement, reasoning that agreements to
relinquish children for adoption violated public policy. 136 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, on the other hand, found that such agreements
were enforceable in cases involving a gestational surrogate. 137 While
several states have statutes that appear to apply the New Jersey solu-
tion, they do not usually distinguish between full and gestational sur-
rogacy. In other states authority exists for listing the genetic parents
in gestational surrogacy arrangements on the birth certificate. 38 In
134 K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
135 Peggy Orenstein, The Other Mother, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2004, at 24 (highlight-
ing the Appeals Court's decision).
1-61n re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
131 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993).
138 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6 amended by ILL. LAWS 93-921 (West 2004); FLA.
STAT. ch. 742.16 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 to 162 (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. §
69.14 (1) (h) (2003-2004); Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass.
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any event, participants and practitioners in states without established
law have assumed that gestational surrogacy would be given effect,
39
or they have taken the chance that the surrogate will renege on her
agreement and proceeded anyway.
A second set of issues issue for gay couples who reproduce using a
surrogate is the allocation of rearing rights and duties between the
male partners. There is a direct parallel here to the issues that gay
women have faced when one partner has provided neither gametes
nor gestation. The partner providing the sperm would be the legal
father, but in most states the non-biologic partner would have no pa-
rental rights or duties until he adopted the child. As a result, gay
male couples who use surrogate mothers to reproduce will have to
choose which one will provide the sperm. 140  If they have more than
one child, they could alternate genetic parentage. One incident of
same-sex marriage and perhaps of civil unions is that the non-biologic
spouse would automatically become a parent if the child is born dur-
ing their marriage or union. Such would also be the case if an inten-
tion-based approach to rearing rights and duties were applied.'
4
'
D. Summary
In sum, there are few direct legal barriers on gay and lesbian ac-
cess to assisted reproduction. Indeed, state laws that prohibited ac-
cess to ARTs by single persons or gays and lesbians would most
likely be constitutionally invalid. Instead of legal barriers, gays and
2001) (holding that genetic parents of twins carried by surrogate gestational carrier pursuant to
contract could be identified as their parents in birth certificate information supplied by hospital);
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (permitting petitioner's biological
parents' names to be placed on the birth certificate); Arredondo ex rel. Arredondo v. Nodelman,
622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (ordering issuance of birth certificate with biological
mother's name); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (C.P. Ohio 1994) (holding that where the
genetic parents did not relinquish their rights, parentage was determined by genetic imprint
rather than birth).
139 A single male or gay couple engaging a surrogate might also obtain an egg donor to
make the arrangement one of gestational surrogacy, so that the surrogate will have fewer rights
to change her mind at birth.
140 Some gay males couples have requested that embryos formed with the sperm of each be
placed in the surrogate's uterus, so that each partner will not know for sure without further
testing which partner is the father. While this practice may enable each partner to view himself
as the father, such arrangements will not eliminate the need for genetic testing to determine
parentage if divorce or separation occurs except in those few states that recognize the parties'
intention as determining parentage. See text accompanying supra notes 121 and 122. One might
also speculate that at some point in the mid-distant future, it might become possible to have each
partner contribute genetic material to the child through embryo fusion or haploidization tech-
niques. See discussion below at pp 45-49.
141 The intention-based approach would not apply to such cases because the rules for de-
termining male parentage do not extend to such situations, as they do in the case of women.
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lesbians couples and single persons may face private discrimination
from providers unwilling to provide them with some or all of the ser-
vices which they need to reproduce. Most state civil right laws do not
bar discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and thus permit
such private discrimination to occur. The lack of certainty about rear-
ing rights and duties in resulting offspring is curable by careful plan-
ning and step-parent adoption. In the end, the lack of resources to pay
for ART procedures may be a greater barrier for gays and lesbians
seeking medical assistance to reproduce than is the law.
VI. "GAY GENES" AND PRENATAL SELECTION FOR SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
In addition to making procreation feasible, ARTs are increasingly
being used for genetically screening of prospective offspring before
birth. Most screening has focused on preventing severe genetic dis-
ease or susceptibility conditions in offspring, but eventually some
non-medical traits may also be identifiable before birth. Plausible
arguments exist that a person's procreative liberty includes to some
degree the right to obtain genetic information about gametes, em-
bryos, or fetuses prior to birth and to use that information to have or
avoid having a particular child. 142 We have had, however, too little
experience with genetic selection and its many ramifications to re-
solve definitively the scope of such a right.
If such a right exists and genetic tests for particular traits are avail-
able, one potential candidate for preconception genetic screening and
selection would be genes that predispose toward or associate an indi-
vidual with a homosexual orientation. If such genes exist, they are
likely to be mutations or genetic variations that affect testosterone
production at three critical points in the life-span of an individual-in
the fetus, in early infancy, or at puberty. 143 Identifying such genes
will not be easy. A few years ago studies showed that genes associ-
ated with homosexuality existed on the X chromosome, but the find-
ing have not been confirmed.' 44 Other areas of genomic origin are
being studied, but there is no guarantee that a specific genetic basis
for sexual orientation will ever be found. If such genes are discov-
ered, the question of whether homosexual or heterosexual persons
142 John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U.L. REV. 421,
424-429 (1996).
143 See Daniel D. Freedman, Three Facets of Sexual Differentiation, 350 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 4 (2004).
I" Dean Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male
Sexual Orientatiion, 261 SCIENCE 321, 326 (1993); George Rice et al., Male Homosexuality:
Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite Markers at Xq28, 284 SCIENCE 665, 667 (1999).
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would be able to use ARTs or other techniques to choose sexual ori-
entation of prospective offspring would become a major social issue.
Although hypothetical, it is instructive to consider to what extent a
person's reproductive rights might entitle a person to use genetic se-
lection or alteration techniques to choose the sexual orientation of
their offspring. 
145
A popular play several years ago portrayed the conflict confronting
a father whose wife is pregnant with a male fetus with the genetic
marker for homosexuality. 146 The drama concerned the protaganist's
struggles over whether to abort his would-be gay son. If pre-birth
tests for sexual orientation became available, we would face the ques-
tion of whether parents would be free to abort fetuses, or more likely,
select embryos, that have a particular sexual orientation.
Because such a gene is likely to be manifested in families, such
tasks are likely to be of primary interest to those with some family
history of homosexuality, rather than to the population at large. Gays
or lesbians might seek it in order to have a child who also will be ho-
mosexual. They may feel that they are more likely to understand and
bond with such a child, and can better prepare it for the challenges of
life. 147 More likely, some heterosexual couples with family members
who are homosexual may care deeply enough about it to prefer not to
have a child with the genes for homosexuality. The partner of such a
person, for example, might want screening to minimize the chance
that their offspring will have that sexual orientation.
In either case a couple or individual could claim that they should
be free to choose their child's sexual orientation if it would strongly
and plausibly affect their willingness to reproduce. In assessing that
claim, a key issue would be how important such selection would be
for the parental project of successful gene transmission to the next
generation. 148 For some parents the idea of raising a gay child poses a
number of problems, including the reduced likelihood that such a
child would have progeny that would continue the parents' genes.
Although few people might seek to screen on grounds of sexual orien-
145 See also Timothy F. Murphy, Controlling the Sexual Orientation of Children, in TIMO-
THY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE: THE ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION RESEARCH 103-136
(1999); Edward Stein, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 305 (1999); Edgar Dahl, Ethical Issues in New Uses of Preirnplantation
Genetic Diagnosis: Should Parents Be Allowed to Use Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to
Choose the Sexual Orientation of Their Children?, 18 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1368 (2003).
146 JONATHAN TOLINS, THE TWILIGHT OF THE GOLDS: A PLAY IN TWO ACTS (1994).
147 As my colleague Tony Reese points out, they may also find it desirable to counteract
those straight couples who are selecting against gay offspring.
148 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 Am. J.L. &
MED. 439, 449-450 (2003) (examining the reasons for genetic selection).
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tation, particularly if the screening were costly or physically intrusive,
it would be difficult to argue that parents would not be exercising
procreative liberty in seeking to screen and exclude on that basis. 149
Similarly, some gays might argue that they would reproduce only if
they could use techniques that would increase the chance of having a
gay child. Because such a child would not be born unless genetic
selection occurred, and being gay is not inconsistent with having a
rich and rewarding life, protecting the welfare of the child would not
be a compelling reason to ban such selection.
In the case of selection against homosexuality, the couples making
that choice might be acting out of bias or prejudice against homo-
sexuality (or against heterosexuality by homosexuals who seek a gay
child), but reproductive and associational freedom permits persons in
the private sphere to discriminate as they choose. One could strongly
support equal rights for gays and lesbians in all public and institu-
tional spheres, yet still find that this choice is within their procreative
discretion. Nor could one easily show that allowing such choices
would be a continued public demeaning of homosexuals, who are still
publicly discriminated against in many ways, because it occurs in
private. We may hope that the genetics of sexual orientation never
lends itself to simple tests to screen children for sexual orientation.
But if that knowledge develops, it may be hard to show that it does
not fit within the rights of parents to decide about the characteristics
of offspring. 1
50
VII. FUTURISTIC TECHNIQUES: CLONING AND CHIMERIZATION
The ARTs discussed above (with the exception of screening for a
"gay" gene) all concern alternatives to coital reproduction for gays
and lesbians to have offspring. If they are single, the requested tech-
nique substitutes the egg and uterus or sperm that is ordinarily pro-
vided in heterosexual intercourse with that provided by a gamete do-
nor or gestational surrogate. For lesbian couples, ARTs will allow
one partner to provide the egg and the other the gestation, but sperm
is still needed from a donor.
149 The choice of gay parents to have gay children, who might themselves face obstacles to
their own reproduction, is not inconsistent with a reproductive agenda of gene transmission to
subsequent generations, because those gay offspring might also then use assisted reproductive
techniques to reproduce, just as their own gay parents did. In any event, in selecting for a child
with gay genes, gay parents are engaged in the culturally defined project of reproduction as
having genetic progeny and parenting them in the next generation.
150Nor would a child chosen in part to have a particular sexual orientation be a product or
commodity of manufacture anymore than a child chosen for gender might be. One has no
particular design for the child beyond being healthy and having the sexual orientation chosen.
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Some persons have speculated that in the future techniques might
become available that will by-pass the need to have an egg or sperm
donor, allowing individuals to reproduce themselves through cloning,
or allowing two same-sex individuals to produce an embryo and child
that has the genes of both of them. Many in the gay community have
hailed such techniques as ways around the discrimination that gays
and lesbians face. Although such techniques are highly speculative
and may never become available, they are discussed here as a way to
show the outer limits or future possibilities of using technology to
enable gays and lesbians to procreate and choose their genetic charac-
teristics in the process. As the discussion will show, there is no easy
technological fix for the desire of gays and lesbians--or indeed, any-
one-to have extensive control over the genetic make-up of offspring.
A. Reproductive Cloning
Although reproductive cloning has occurred in a number of mam-
malian species, it remains difficult, has low success rates, and often
bad effects on offspring. It is nowhere close to being safe and effec-
tive for humans, and may never be.15' As a result, any discussion of
reproductive cloning for humans-whether heterosexual or homosex-
ual-is highly speculative. Discussion, however, of whether an indi-
vidual would have a right to produce progeny by reproductive cloning
may nonetheless shed light on the scope of reproductive rights of per-
sons. Despite the many obstacles to successful reproductive cloning,
the following discussion asks whether anyone, including gays and
lesbians, would have a right to use reproductive cloning if that tech-
nique has been shown to be as safe and effective as other reproductive
procedures.
As with other techniques, whether reproductive cloning would be
available to gays and lesbians would depend first on whether it is
generally available at all. If there is no right generally to engage in
reproductive cloning, then no one, including gays and lesbians, would
have a right to engage in that practice. On the other hand, if the right
to use the technique were generally recognized, then it would be dif-
ficult to justifiably deny its use by gay men and lesbians.
Analysis of the question of whether persons generally have a right
to engage in reproductive cloning would turn on whether it served
core reproductive interests without harming others. A plausible ar-
gument in favor of reproductive cloning would be strongest in the
case of persons who are gametically infertile and have no other way
15' Rudolph Jaenisch, "The Science and Ethics of Nuclear Transplantation, 351 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 2787 (2004).
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to have and rear genetically related offspring. 152 It would not follow,
however, that all persons have a right to clone, including those who
are sexually fertile. Because they could reproduce sexually, sexually
fertile persons who assert a right to clone are in fact asserting a right
to select the genome of offspring, not a right to reproduce as such.
Until a more general right to select offspring characteristics is recog-
nized, one could plausibly argue that reproductive cloning, if safe and
effective, should be available only to those persons who could not
have progeny without it.
The distinction between reproductive cloning for the infertile but
not the fertile has relevance to the question of gay and lesbian access
to reproductive cloning. Gays and lesbians have expressed a special
interest in reproductive cloning because of the discrimination which
they have experienced in their efforts to have and rear children. 53
Indeed, persons in the gay and lesbian community were among the
first proponents of cloning, perceiving cloning as a way to control
their reproduction free of discrimination in their efforts to procreate.
For lesbians it offered the unique advantage of reproduction without
the need of a male, which is an important goal for some lesbians. It
also allowed a woman to reproduce alone, for she herself could pro-
vide the oocyte, nuclear DNA from a somatic cell, and gestation
needed to produce a child. The appeal of cloning to gay males is less
clear. It may be based less on grounds of feasibility as in the case of
lesbians, and more on the wish to select the genome of the child.
1. Lesbian Cloning
As shown above, lesbians have the same right to reproduce that
other women, single or married, have, i.e., the right to have geneti-
cally-related children to rear. 54 Lesbian cloning poses the question of
whether sexually fertile lesbians who may reproduce with a male
partner or with sperm from a donor or commercial sperm bank never-
theless have a right to choose this method of having a child.
Because fertile lesbians have no physical or social impediment to
assisted sexual reproduction, it might seem that their claim to engage
15 2 See John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 633-
637 (1998-1999); John A.Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L.
& MED. 439, 468-473 (2003). While recognizing that other grounds for reproductive cloning
plausibly exist, I limit my analysis to those who are otherwise gametically infertile rather than
those who are capable of having progeny through intercourse or assisted reproduction.
153 William Eskridge & Edward Stein, Queer Cloning, in CLONES AND CLONES 95 (Martha
Nussbaum & Cass Sunstein, Eds., 1998).
154Gay males also have the same rights to reproduce and rear that heterosexual males
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in reproductive cloning is more a claim of a right to select the genome
of offspring than a right to reproduce as such. Some lesbian couples,
however, might argue that the decision to clone is not impelled so
much by the desire to select a particular genome as it is to have a
child free of sperm or gametes outside the lesbian relationship. In
addition, reproductive cloning would enable each partner to contrib-
ute genetically to the child whom they would both rear (one providing
the nuclear DNA and the other cytoplasm and mitochondrial DNA,
with either of them gestating).1
55
In such a case the normative question presented by a lesbian cou-
ple's choice to clone rather than reproduce sexually is whether their
desire to reproduce without male involvement should be respected as
much as the desire of infertile persons to use reproductive cloning to
have genetic progeny. If a lesbian couple's wish to have children
without male gametes is valued as an essential part of meaningful
procreation for them, then the need to clone herself or her partner
could plausibly be viewed as a case of reproductive failure due to
normative infertility.156 If so, they should be allowed to use reproduc-
tive cloning to the same extent as would a gametically infertile het-
erosexual couple that chose cloning of the husband over anonymous
sperm donation.
The case of a single lesbian requesting reproductive cloning war-
rants a similar analysis. A single woman would have no need to
clone in order to have genetically-related children because through
artificial insemination or coitus she could conceive and then gestate a
child. A single woman who did not want a male source of sperm,
even anonymous donor sperm from a commercial sperm bank, might
elect to clone herself. If her choice to eschew male gametes is re-
spected as an essential part of her person, she too would suffer from
normative infertility, and be in the same position as an infertile het-
erosexual couple who decide to clone instead of using an anonymous
sperm donor.
157
155The possibility of sharing mtDNA and nuclear DNA may limit the desire to create a
chimera made from clones of each, if that procedure were ever safe and legal, in order to pro-
duce a child sharing the genes of each partner. See Eskridge and Stein, supra note 153 at 96-97;
LEE SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 178 (1997).
156 Although the term is novel, it seems to accurately describe the position of the couple
who would reproduce only if they could avoid male gametes.
'57 If a 'ingle lesbian has the right to clone herself, it may be difficult to bar single hetero-
sexual fertile woman from doing so as well. One issue would be whether the preference to
procreate by cloning oneself rather than use donor sperm carries more weight when it derives
from a lesbian ideology or belief system than when it springs from the convenience of not
having to risk having a child with a genetic father who might later claim rearing rights. Of
course, the clone source's own father would be the genetic father of the clone of the woman,
though his social role, if any, would be that of grandfather rather than father.
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2. Gay Male Cloning
It is much harder to view gay males who are sexually fertile as suf-
fering from normative infertility in asserting a right to clone, as might
plausibly be argued in some cases of lesbian cloning. No man,
whether gay or straight, can reproduce sexually or by cloning without
the assistance of women to provide an egg and gestate. Nor is it pos-
sible for each male partner to contribute biologically to the child in
the way that each lesbian partner could, with one partner providing
mtDNA and cytoplasm and gestating and the other providing nuclear
DNA.158 If a woman's cooperation must in any case be obtained to
provide an egg and gestation, cloning alone will not enable a man to
produce a child who has no alternative feasible way to have a genetic
child to rear.
The claim of a right by gay males to employ reproductive cloning
to have a child would thus seem more accurately described as the
claim of a right to choose the genome of offspring rather than the
right to have a child at all. 159 If single or married heterosexuals do not
have the right to clone themselves or others when they can reproduce
sexually, it is hard to see why gay males should have a greater right to
clone. Of course, if heterosexuals are permitted to clone when there
is no reproductive failure, then homosexuals should be free to do so
as well.
B. Chimerization and Haploidization
Other speculative techniques occasionally discussed in connection
with gay and lesbian procreation are the possibility of creating human
chimeric or haploidized embryos as a way to enable two persons of
the same sex to procreate using the gametes of each. Such tech-
niques are much further off than reproductive cloning and may pose
even greater physical risks for offspring.16° A very strong showing of
158 A chimera created with the genes of two different males would make each a genetic fa-
ther of the child, but such a procedure is too distant in the future to be a practical option. In any
event, an egg and gestation provided by a female would still be necessary. See discussion infra
at pp. 404-05.
159 The case of a gay infertile male would be different. He could argue that he needs to
clone in order to have a genetically-related child to rear. If single infertile heterosexual males
have the right to clone themselves, then it homosexual males should as well, for one cannot
meaningfully distinguish their interest in having genetically-related children for rearing or their
ability to rear based on their sexual orientation.
160I do not discuss parthenogenesis (birth from an oocyte), which occurs in some reptiles
and invertebrates. Although the birth of an apparently healthy mouse from the combination of
two eggs has been reported, few laboratories would be capable of duplicating that technique and
it appears to have no useful human applications. Gretchen Vogel, "Japanese Scientists Create
Fatherless Mouse," 304 Science 501 (2004). Nor do I discuss the possibility of deriving gam-
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safety in primates and early human embryonic development would
have to occur the use of such techniques could ethically be offered.
Indeed, the barriers are so great that such a procedure may never be
feasible. Discussion is nevertheless useful for exploring the outer
limits of genetic selection and alteration in the context of gay and
lesbian procreation.
Chimerization. Although Greek mythology refers to a chimera as
a mixture of two species, in reproductive biology the term refers to
the combination cells from two separate individuals. Since 1961 sci-
entists have been able to create chimeric mice by combining cells
from different mouse embryos. Each cell retains its identity. But as
the embryo develops, the cells derived from different embryos mix
together and communicate as if they had the same origin. When the
animal is born, every tissue within the body is a mixture of cells from
the original two embryos. 61 With mice, unless two strains with dif-
ferent coat colors have been combined, there is no way to tell that
they are chimeric. However, if a female embryo is joined with a male
embryo, then intersex problems may arise.
The mammalian data and reports in the literature of over 100 hu-
man chimeras that have fused naturally (reversing the process of natu-
ral twinning) suggest that creating human chimeras might also be
feasible. Most cases of naturally-occurring human chimeras appear to
be healthy and have no major physical problems. 62 If embryos of
different sexes combine, there would be the risk of an intersexed per-
son, with both male and female chromosomes. However, unless the
intersexuality drastically affects the gonads or external genitalia of the
person, their chimeric status may go undetected and may not even
prevent them from reproducing.
The idea of creating chimeric offspring as a way to procreate
might appeal to same-sex couples who wish to have a child with ge-
netic contributions from each instead of the half that would be present
if sperm or egg from another were used to conceive a child. Chimeri-
zation might occur as follows. Each member of the same-sex pair
etes from embryonic stem cells. While there may be potential medical applications from gam-
etes derived in this way, the ability to derive female gametes from male embryonic stem cells
and vice versa is an additional hurdle that would have to be overcome to make this technique
relevant to gays and lesbians. The topic is too speculative to merit further discussion here.
Guiseppe Testa & John Harris, Ethical Aspects of Embryonic-Stem Cell Derived Gametes, 305
SCIENCE 1719 (2004).
161 For a description of how this might occur, see SILVER, supra note 155 at 180-87.
162 Neng Yu et al., Disputed Maternity Leading to Identification of Tetragametic Chimer-
ism, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1545 (2002).
163 SILVER, supra note 155 at 181.
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would provide gametes to create an IVF embryo (the male couple
using donated eggs and the female couple donated sperm). At the 8
cell stage each embryo would have one cell removed to determine its
sex, so that only embryos of the same sex would be combined (each
couple could produce either males or females). Those embryos would
then be moved together, activated with a slight electrical charge, and
given a reconstructed cell coating (zona pellucida) to protect them. 64
Those fused embryos that continue to cleave and appear healthy
would, in the case of a male couple, then be transferred to the uterus
of a gestational surrogate mother. The resulting child would have two
genetic male parents and one female genetic parent (two if different
egg donors were used). If a female couple has used this technique,
then either or both of them could gestate the fused embryos. The
resulting child would have two genetic mothers and, if the same
sperm donor is used, one genetic father.
If chimerization had been shown to be safe and effective for its in-
tended purpose (which may be very difficult to show), should gays
and lesbians be free to use such procedures to have offspring with the
genomes of each? Some persons would object to creating chimeric
children for same-sex couples on the ground that it offends the "hu-
manity of human procreation." 165 Others would find a greater objec-
tion to be the risk of harm to resulting offspring. However, extensive
mouse data and the reports of naturally-occurring human chimeras
suggests that their health, vitality, and life-spans would be compara-
ble to that of non-chimeric children. Perhaps the greatest risk is that
this could lead to children with a patchy complexion or hair color, just
as occurs if mice with different strains of fur are combined. It is un-
clear, however, how frequently such cases would occur, and when
they did, what their psycho-social effects on children would be.
Strictly speaking, chimeric children would not have been harmed
by being born because they have no other way to be born but as chi-
meras. Yet many people would question whether couples who choose
novel procedures that have a high risk of producing children with
severe deficits are seeking the usual goods of human procreation,
particularly when they are sexually fertile. In addition to the physical
effect on offspring, a key factor in moral and legal evaluations of
chimerization is whether the same-sex couple creating the chimeric
child is committed to loving and nurturing the child for itself. If so, it
may be hard to deny that parents are exercising procreative liberty.
14Id. at 177-78.
..
5 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 5 (2004).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
It is less clear that the logic of constitutional doctrines of procrea-
tive liberty would extend that far. Because each of the partners could
have a genetically-related child by non-chimeric methods, it may be
difficult for them to argue that chimerization is essential for them to
reproduce. At that point they could claim that it is the only way that
they could biologically procreate with their same-sex partner. The
question then would be whether same-sex joint genetic reproduction
is so important a reproductive interest that they should have the free-
dom to proceed. The judgment required here is similar to the judg-
ment required when a lesbian individual or couple claims that repro-
ductive cloning is essential because it is the only way that they may
reproduce without a male.
As the discussion has shown, the prospect of chimerization is
highly speculative and may never need to be faced in practice. A
growing acceptance of same-sex marriage and gay and lesbian repro-
duction with other ARTs might sufficiently satisfy the desire of gays
and lesbians that few persons to procreate would seek to use such an
exotic method. In any event, a much greater recognition than now
exists of the right of individuals to choose the genomes of their off-
spring would be necessary for chimerization, if physically safe, ever
to be accepted.
Haploidization. Another speculative way to combine the genes of
each same-sex partner would be through a process called haploidiza-
tion. Haploidization techniques build on the recognition that the proc-
ess of fertilization first produces a pronuclei consisting of the haploid
genome provided by each gamete before they integrate with each
other some 20 hours after fertilization at syngamy. If one of the hap-
loid pronuclei is removed before it combines with the other, it could
be joined with the haploid pronuclei of the partner produced in an-
other fertilization. Two female haploid pronuclei could then be com-
bined in one enucleated egg, as could two male haploid pronuclei, to
form a diploid individual half of whose chromosomes come from one
partner and the other half from the other.'
66
Haploidization shares the same problems of faulty imprinting of
genes and other epigenetic problems as do reproductive cloning, and
has had even less success in mice and other mammals. Only after the
procedure was well-established in primates could one ethically try it
in humans. At that point its use in humans would raise the same array
166See SILVER, supra note 155 at 177-178. For a use of haploidization to create gametes,
see Antonio Regalado, Could a Skin Cell Someday Replace Sperm or Egg? WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2002, at B1; Zsolt Peter Nagy et al., Development of an Efficient Method to Obtain A rti-
cially Produced Haploid Mammalian Oocytes by Transfer of G2/M Phase Somatic Cells to GV
Ooplasts, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY SI (Supp. 2002).
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of issues that operate with creation of chimeras and reproductive
cloning when fertile as a way to have genetically related offspring.
Although the child born as a result would not, strictly speaking, have
been harmed by its birth because it had no other way to have been
born, there is still the question of whether a sexually fertile individual
or couple interested in the welfare and well-being of their child would
have a child in this way. 167 That in turn would turn on whether the
need of a person to have their haploid genome passed on to another is
so important to them that should have the freedom to undertake such
an action. The easy availability of other alternatives for gay and les-
bian reproduction suggests skepticism about the importance of that
need. 1
68
VIII. CONCLUSION
The long march toward equal rights for gays and lesbians took a
great leap forward in 2003 with court decisions striking down laws
against homosexual sodomy and marriage. As society continues to
examine the rights of gays and lesbians, attention will focus on their
desires to have and raise families through the use of assisted repro-
ductive technologies. Although gays and lesbians appear to be as ca-
pable of being good parents as are heterosexuals, some jurisdictions
and some clinics may deny them access to ARTs and other services or
arrangements that they need to procreate.
This article has shown that concerns about the welfare of resulting
children are not persuasive grounds for denying gays and lesbians
access to ARTs or to same-sex marriage. The children born to same-
sex married couples or to single or unmarried gays and lesbians
through ARTs would not have existed if procreation by their gay and
lesbian partners had not occurred. Given that gay and lesbian parents
are as equally capable of providing a caring and meaningful rearing
environment as are other persons, there is no basis for claiming that
offspring are harmed by being born to gay and lesbian parents. Even
if states have the right to prefer heterosexual persons in placing chil-
dren for adoption, they have no right to deny gays and lesbians the
right to procreate by denying them equal access to the ARTs needed
for that purpose. Whether private actors should be permitted to make
those judgments will remain controversial.
167 See Robertson, supra note 75, at 21.
168 For example, if a gay male couple wishes to use this technique, wouldn't it be better for
them to alternate providing donor sperm to a surrogate, so that each would be the genetic father
of a different child?
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Once legal rights are clarified, gay and lesbian access to assisted
reproduction will depend on what ART techniques are generally
available to persons seeking to reproduce. Fertility programs now
offer a wide range of reproductive and genetic services. Gays and
lesbians should then have access to IVF, gamete donation, and surro-
gacy to have families just as heterosexuals do. If it becomes feasible
to screen embryos or gametes for genes predisposing toward sexual
orientation, then both gay and straight individuals should have access
to such screening once the right of couples to select non-medical traits
of offspring prior to birth is recognized. Reproductive cloning and
the use of chimerization and haploidization techniques to combine the
genes of same-sex persons is highly speculative, and would not, under
current conceptions of procreative liberty, likely be available.
Opponents of same-sex marriage have argued strenuously that rec-
ognition of the right of gays and lesbians to marry will dilute the
meaning of marriage, diminish the importance of the institution, harm
the welfare of children, and even threaten long-term social stability.
Analogous charges have or might be leveled at policies and practices
that ensure gay men and lesbians access to ARTs in order to procre-
ate. I have argued that harm to future offspring is not a sufficient
basis for denying to gays and lesbians the means to reproduce that are
available to heterosexuals. Rather than undermine families or harm
offspring, access to ARTs for gays and lesbians will promote parent-
ing and family values, just as it does for heterosexuals.
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